Follow along with the video below to see how to install our site as a web app on your home screen.
Note: This feature currently requires accessing the site using the built-in Safari browser.
Atlanticist small talk is all that's left
By Mark Steyn
(Filed: 22/02/2005)
"The change for the moment is more in tone than substance," wrote Alec Russell, reporting on President Bush's European outreach in yesterday's Telegraph. You don't say.
My colleague is almost right. In Brussels yesterday, the President's "charm offensive" consisted of saying the same things he always says on Iraq, Iran, Palestine, the illusion of stability, the benefits of freedom, the need for Egypt and Saudi Arabia to get with the programme, etc. But, tone-wise, the Bush charm offensive did its best to keep the offensiveness reasonably charming though his references to anti-Semitism and the murder of Theo van Gogh by a Dutch Islamist were a little more pointed than his hosts would have cared for.
But, in the broader sense vis-à-vis Europe, the administration is changing the tone precisely because it understands there can be no substance. And, if there's no substance that can be changed, what's to quarrel about? International relations are like ex-girlfriends: if you're still deluding yourself you can get her back, every encounter will perforce be fraught and turbulent; once you realise that's never gonna happen, you can meet for a quick decaf latte every six make that 10 months and do the whole hey-isn't-it-terrific-the-way-we're-able-to-be-such-great-friends routine because you couldn't care less. You can even make a few pleasant noises about her new romance (the so-called European Constitution) secure in the knowledge he's a total loser.
World leaders are always most expansive when there's least at stake: the Queen's Christmas message to the Commonwealth is the ne plus ultra of this basic rule. In Her Majesty's beloved Commonwealth family, talking about enduring ties became a substitute for having them.
That's the salient feature of transatlantic dialogue since 9/11: it's become Commonwealth-esque - all airy assertions about common values, ties of history, all meaningless. Even Donald Rumsfeld is doing it. At the Munich Conference on Collective Security the other day, he gave a note-perfect rendition of empty Atlanticist Euro-goo: "Our collective security depends on our co-operation and mutual respect and understanding," he declared, with a straight face.
Rummy's appearance in Munich was unscheduled. A German federal prosecutor was investigating a war crimes complaint against the US Defence Secretary and, although it seems unlikely even the silliest showboating Europoseurs would have been foolish enough to pull a Pinochet on him, Rumsfeld made a point of not setting foot on German soil until Berlin put an end to that nonsense. That tells you more about transatlantic relations than anything in the speech.
But, just for the record, the "collective security" blather is completely bogus. In the column I wrote on September 11, 2001, I mentioned en passant that among the day's consequences would be the end of Nato - "a military alliance for countries that no longer in any recognisable sense have militaries". I can't remember why I mentioned Europe and Nato in that 9/11 column. It seems an odd thing to be thinking about as the towers were falling.
But it was clear, even then, that the day's events would test the Atlantic relationship and equally clear that it would fail that test. Later that week, for the first time in its history, Nato invoked its famous Article Five - the one about how an attack on one member is an attack on all. But, even as the press release was rolling off the photocopier, most of the "allies" in this post-modern alliance were insisting that the declaration didn't mean anything. "We are not at war," said Belgium. Norway and Germany announced that there would be no deployment of their forces.
Remember last year's much trumpeted Nato summit in Turkey? This was the one at which everyone was excited at how the "alliance" had agreed to expand its role in Afghanistan beyond Kabul to the country's somewhat overly autonomous "autonomous regions".
What this turned out to mean on closer examination was that, after the secretary-general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, put the squeeze on Nato's 26 members, they reluctantly put up an extra 600 troops and three helicopters for Afghanistan. That averages out at 23.08 troops per country, plus almost a ninth of a helicopter apiece. As it transpired, the three Black Hawks all came from one country - Turkey - and they've already gone back. And Afghanistan is supposed to be the good war, the one Continental officials all claim to have supported, if mostly retrospectively and for the purposes of justifying their "principled moral opposition" to Iraq.
A few months before 9/11, I happened to find myself sitting next to an eminent older statesman. "What is Nato for?" he wondered. "Well, you should know," I said. "You were secretary-general. You went into the office every day." With hindsight, he was asking the right question. On the other hand, if Nato is useless to America, it looks like being a goldmine for the Chinese, to whom the Europeans are bent on selling their military technology. Jacques Chirac is pitching this outreach to the politburo in lofty terms, modifying Harold Macmillan and casting Europe as Athens to China's Rome. I can't see it working, but the very attempt presumes that the transatlantic relationship is now bereft of meaning.
Nato will not be around circa 2015 - which is why the Americans are talking it up right now. An organisation that represents the fading residual military will of mostly post-military nations is marginally less harmful than the EU, which is the embodiment of their pacifist delusions. But, either way, there's not a lot to talk about. Try to imagine significant numbers of French, German or Belgian troops fighting alongside American forces anywhere the Yanks are likely to find themselves in the next decade or so: it's not going to happen.
America and Europe both face security threats. But the difference is America's are external, and require hard choices in tough neighbourhoods around the world, while the EU's are internal and, as they see it, unlikely to be lessened by the sight of European soldiers joining the Great Satan in liberating, say, Syria. That's not exactly going to help keep the lid on the noisier Continental mosques.
So what would you do in Bush's shoes? Slap 'em around a bit? What for? Where would it get you? Or would you do exactly what he's doing? Climb into the old soup-and-fish, make small talk with Mme Chirac and raise a glass of champagne to the enduring friendship of our peoples: what else is left? This week we're toasting the end of an idea: the death of "the West".
-Allies and Allies
It's worth remembering that America has important friends outside of Europe.
by Tom Donnelly
02/23/2005 12:00:00 AM
http://weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/278vcbkn.asp
LET US TALK OF ALLIES, but not, at least for once this week, of Europeans.
After all, the United States is human history's one and only superpower. Our security concerns are genuinely global; our political principles are universal. So why should we obsess primarily about how we are regarded only in Paris or Berlin?
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is an irritating man, to be sure, but all the more so for being intermittently insightful. One of Rumsfeld's rules is that the mission determines the coalition. In the early 21st century, the United States has two important missions if it is to achieve its strategic goal of preserving today's Pax Americana: (1) Transform the politics of the greater Middle East; (2) Contain the growing military power of the People's Republic of China.
Who else is interested in tackling those tasks?
Very few other nations have much hankering to sign up for both missions. But several might. To begin with, Japan appears to be undergoing a true strategic renaissance, even to the point now of pushing the Bush administration to take its responsibilities in East Asia seriously and not sublimate the problem of China entirely to concerns in the Middle East. Indeed, there's an instructive study to be done comparing Japan's recent revitalization with Germany's continuing geostrategic decline. How much war guilt is too much war guilt? In the brief pause between the Eurolove-fests of the past two weeks, it was leaked that Japan has essentially agreed to conduct a joint defense of Taiwan with the United States. This is a huge development and an act of real courage by the Japanese government.
Japan's embrace of U.S. primacy in East Asia also makes its contributions to American adventures in the Middle East far more significant than they would first appear. Even after the first Gulf War, Japan contributed a tremendous amount to offset the costs of U.S. military operations; it continues to be a reliable contributor--despite the slowing of economic growth in Japan--but now is participating directly in military and reconstruction operations. It's not simply that the Japanese regard this as the price of a firm alliance with the United States--they also see the grand strategic connections of global politics. Tokyo well understands how unrest in the Middle East creates potential unrest in East Asia.
What can Japan bring to the table?
Like the United States, Japan has developed a fully modern economy without succumbing to post-modern politics. With the North Koreans popping missiles above the home islands and a rising China just across the sea, Japanese strategists are focused, and are animated by a sense of urgency hard to find even in London. Lately it seems like the Japanese take the military balance across the Taiwan Strait even more seriously than the Taiwanese do themselves.
Militarily, the Japanese also have a lot to offer. Not the least of these qualities is location--airfields and other facilities in Japan are absolutely essential to the conduct of any significant U.S. military operations in the region. Without access to these airfields, a defense of Taiwan would be close to impossible. Further, the Japanese "Self-Defense Force"--the euphemism which identifies the Japanese military--is a very capable force, especially the navy and air force, with a relatively high degree of interoperability with U.S. forces. The Japanese have been taking steps to improve upon both their own capabilities and their compatibility with U.S. forces, including in controversial areas such as missile defense. Again, this is in contrast to most European forces, which are falling farther behind American technological and tactical standards.
But perhaps the most important aspect of the improving U.S.-Japanese alliance is its demonstration effect. While Europeans--well, French, Germans, and Belgians--are so self-referential that it's likely that the Japanese lesson will be lost on them, others will be paying close attention not only to the Japanese embrace of Pax Americana but to the reasoning behind it. In simplest terms, that reasoning is as follows: The spread of free and representative governments occasioned by the Pax Americana is not only morally good, but tends toward peace and prosperity; China and radical Islamists, by their own assertions, take issue with the current international order; and the use of military force is occasionally and lamentably necessary to preserve and protect that order. Ergo, a military alliance with the United States makes sense.
What is sensible to Japan may well appeal to others (Australia, South Korea, Thailand, India) who, unlike most Europeans, feel the world is still a dangerous place and for whom the practices of political liberty seem more under threat. India might well come to similar conclusions. One of the more misguided--not to say myopic--beliefs of European statesmen is that the United States needs its European partners. Even President Bush says the Euro-American relationship is the prime pillar of U.S. strategy. But Europeans think themselves more attractive than they really are. Yes, it would be preferable to maintain the transatlantic alliance of shared interests and more-or-less shared values (There's that ill-defined, virtually meaningless phrase again. See above post). But these days there are allies whom we may need more.
onedomino said:I agree with the substance of the posted article. The "West" became terminal in 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell. It died when the US invaded Iraq. There is an Anglo remnant of the West: America, UK, and Australia, but that's about it. The babble about shared values between America and the EU is incoherent. What values does America share with the socialists on the Iberian Peninsula, the Gaullists, Germanys Social-Democrats, and Britains Labor Party? The US and the EU are on different trajectories into the future. The real question is: what replaces the West? Political and economic confrontation between the US and the EU is todays reality. Does military confrontation wait in the future? There are those that think the EU will fail. I am not among them. What shape will the EU Defense Force have in 2020? Will the EU participate in what will become the American led militarization of Space? It is hard to believe that only America-Japan-Australia will have Ballistic Missile Defense and anti-satellite weapons. When America confronted the now dead Soviet Union, Europe was center stage. Now Europe is no longer the fulcrum of international affairs. The new center of geopolitical gravity is the Pacific Basin and the emerging competition between America-Japan-Australia v. China. We know where the EU stands in that competition: ready to provide weapons to China.
