Peace Conference of 1861 - Committee of thirty-three

Wry Catcher

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Aug 3, 2009
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Lots of noise on the US Message Board regarding the antebellum period in our nation's history. Reading from CD's of the NYT archives, my curiosity peaked when I read about peace efforts and the C-33 on the front page of the NYT March, 1861.

Many on the New Right make claims I knew to be absurd, especially in regard to the precursors of the Civil War and its causes. Claims that slavery was not the primary cause are put to rest in reading from the CD's, thus I decided to post a summary of events from Wikipedia. Those who believe that source is suspect are invited to go to primary sources, the newspapers of the day.

Peace Conference of 1861 - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia
 
One of the problems with the Wikipedia format is that since each article is distinct and editors obsessively argue about when articles should be merged or not, it is easy for the forest to become masked by the trees. December 1860--March 1861 saw numerous interlocking efforts to arrive at a political solution, almost all of which involved a complete Republican capitulation, which was not going to happen. The Washington Peace Conference, the Committee of Thirty Three, the Crittenden Compromise, the proposed Thirteenth Amendment (which actually passed Congress and was signed by Buchanan) all overlapped.

A controversy has been created claiming that if Lincoln had only been more flexible, war could have been avoided. This is based on a complete misunderstanding of history flavored with base racist motives today.

The key to understanding what happened rests with a careful examination of what Lincoln knew and what he said between the election and the inauguration. My starting point would be a letter written to Lincoln by the General Commanding the United States Army, Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, a Virginian, hero of the Mexican War, and former unsuccessful Whig candidate for president of the United States in 1852, dated October 29, 1860 and acknowledged by Lincoln on November 9. In the letter Scott gave his opinion that secession would lead to four confederacies, that Lincoln should point out the unprofitable nature of slavery in the western territories, that seizure of Southern forts would precede secession, that a policy of moderation and firmness for the next twelve months would perhaps prevent secession, and that although he had no political interests he preferred the Bell-Everett ticket. It is reasonable to infer from this letter that Lincoln in mid-November 1860 would have few illusions about the dangers of secession preceded by seizure of federal properties and forts.

Lincoln's position on slavery and the Union had not altered one iota from the Coopers Union speech early in 1860, and had been reiterated prior to the Chicago Convention. Lincoln personally edited the proofs of the publication of that speech and never deviated from that position. Repeatedly after the election he refused to speak further on the subject, referring everyone to his published speeches. He was fearful that any further comment would have adverse effects from people parsing and reading into his comments ideas that were not there.

Lincoln did, however, write a few remarks for a speech by his friend Senator Lyman Trumbull which Trumbull copied word for word into his draft of the speech. The Lincoln autograph is dated November 20 and the speech was delivered November 21, 1860. This segment (omitting a last sentence unused by Trumbull) stated
I have labored in, and for, the Republican organization with entire confidence that whenever it shall be in power, each and all of the States will be left in as complete control of their own affairs respectively, and at as perfect liberty to choose, and employ, their own means of protecting property, and preserving peace and order within their respective limits, as they have ever been under any administration. Those who have voted for Mr. Lincoln, have expected, and still expect this; and they would not have voted for him had they expected otherwise. I regard it as extremely fortunate for the peace of the whole country, that this point, upon which the Republicans
have been so long, and so persistently misrepresented, is now to be brought to a practical test, and placed beyond the possibility of doubt. [2] Disunionists per se, [3] are now in hot haste to get out of the Union, precisely because they perceive they can not, much longer, maintain apprehension among the Southern people that their homes, and firesides, and lives, are to be endangered by the action of the Federal Government. With such ``Now, or never'' is the maxim. [4]

In a letter dated November 28, 1860 to Henry J Raymond, founder of the New York Times, Lincoln wrote
Yours of the 14th. was received in due course. I have delayed so long to answer it, because my reasons for not coming before the public in any form just now, had substantially appeared in your paper (The Times), and hence I feared they were not deemed sufficient by you, else you would not have written me as you did.

I now think we have a demonstration in favor of my view. On the 20th. Inst. Senator Trumbull made a short speech which I suppose you have both seen and approved. [2] Has a single newspaper, heretofore against us, urged that speech [upon its readers] with a purpose to quiet public anxiety? Not one, so far as I know. On the contrary the Boston Courier, and its' class, hold me responsible for the speech, and endeavor to inflame the North with the belief that it foreshadows an abandonment of Republican ground by the incoming administration; while the Washington Constitution, and its' class hold the same speech up to the South as an open declaration of war against them.

This is just as I expected, and just what would happen with any declaration I could make. These political fiends are not half sick enough yet. ``Party malice'' and not ``public good'' possesses them entirely. ``They seek a sign, and no sign shall be given them.'' At least such is my present feeling and purpose. [Yours very truly

A. LINCOLN]

Lincoln's apprehensions had been proven correct. Any attempt subsequently to clarify or expound was doomed.

Lincoln had sources inside the Buchanan cabinet, and was aware of most political discussions taking place within the Democratic Party and the Buchanan Administration as they occurred. Obviously he had information and advice from General Scott as well. He also had the resources of the party organization in Congress, so the idea that he was out of touch with efforts to negotiate a settlement is absurd.

Finally, the First Inaugural Address presents Lincoln's complete case for the Union and an explicit acceptance of the proposed Thirteenth Amendment sent to the states. The position that Lincoln could have done more without compromising the Union or extending slavery is pure sophistry based on historical ignorance. A parallel reading of the fire eaters speeches and the ordinances of succession would lead to the same conclusion, only more forcefully. Lincoln's premise at Coopers Union was proven: that the South would only be satisfied if the North would not only accept slavery in the South, and the territories, but must cease labeling slavery as wrong and extend it everywhere. As he stated in the Second Inaugural
On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago all thoughts were anxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it, all sought to avert it. While the inaugural address was being delivered from this place, devoted altogether to saving the Union without war, insurgent agents were in the city seeking to destroy it without war—seeking to dissolve the Union and divide effects by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war, but one of them would make war rather than let the nation survive, and the other would accept war rather than let it perish, and the war came.
 
I think part of the problem is that we forget that Lincoln wasn't acting unilaterally in going to war. Congress was all for it right from the start and other than the border states, the remaining states in the union were all gung ho about bringing their brethren back into the fold (kind of puts an interesting spin on the whole states could secede argument when half the state in 1961 said no they can't).

Had Lincoln not go to war or simply dragged his heels, it is likely that Congress would either have forced his hand or outright impeached him and put Hamlin or someone else in place who would gleefully tell the southern state what's what.
 

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