On Singer, Saletan, and Shagging

Agnapostate

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Sep 19, 2008
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The Quake State
I've been meaning to write this for a while, and I finally had time to do it yesterday. It addresses a behavior, that while considered abhorrent to most people, is actually a rather complex ethical issue. To get a general background, you might want to read this first and then read this, though I give a basic summary of each in case you want to just jump right in.

Several years ago, one incident in a series of controversies regarding the utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer attracted attention related to a topic he had not previously discussed: the moral permissibility of sexual interactions with animals. Singer wrote a review of Midas Dekker’s Dearest Pet: On Bestiality entitled Heavy Petting, arguing that sexual interactions with animals that are not harmful to them are morally permissible. This position fits within Singer’s general framework that it is those practices that cause animals to suffer (such as confining them within small cages, or failing to anesthetize them), are morally wrong, most clearly outlined in his book Animal Liberation.

To this controversial position, there was a wide array of responses, ranging from the outraged to the comical. Perhaps the most cogent and comprehensive of all these was journalist William Saletan’s aptly titled Shag the Dog, which repudiated the typically shrill tone of its less enlightened kin. Saletan noted that the majority of articles written purporting to “reply” to Singer failed to do just that, and thus endeavored to produce an article that not only raised a possible objection to Singer’s position, but also highlighted an apparent inconsistency in that position.

Saletan’s reply is based on two related claims, first, that sexual contact with animals (Saletan refers to this behavior as “zoophilia,” but I shall refer to it as “bestiality,” since zoophilia refers to the condition of being sexually attracted to animals, while bestiality refers to the actual behavior), might be considered wrong because animals are not capable of offering informed consent to sexual activity, and second, that Singer’s argument relies on an inconsistency in that he defends the moral permissibility of sexual contact with animals but does not extend that argument to its logical end of defending the moral permissibility of sexual contact with groups comparably incapable of offering informed consent to such activity, specifically children.

Saletan pointed out that there was an inconsistency between demanding that informed consent be required for sexual activity with animals, while not demanding the same for killing them, but he holds that there is a similar inconsistency in Singer’s position, quoting Village Voice columnist Norah Vincent to make his point.

“When someone has sex with an animal, he foists himself on a creature that has the mental and emotional capacity of a child. Thus, it is no more capable than a child of giving meaningful consent. … If you have had sex with someone who is constitutionally incapable of giving anything that might constitute meaningful consent, you have committed rape. At the very least you have taken advantage of a creature over which you exercise considerable power.”

This claim is not without its merits. The capacity to offer informed consent to sexual activity is customarily considered a necessary criterion of such an act. It is this criterion, so it is alleged, that establishes a morally sound framework for preventing the exploitation or abuse of one being by another that possesses a profoundly greater degree of power or hierarchical authority. Yet we can still point to inconsistencies in the application of this criterion. For instance, informed consent is never spoken of in the context of other interactions between animals and their human owners. If sex sans informed consent is rape or sexual abuse, then is not locking a dog inside the house sans informed consent imprisonment? Is not transporting a cat to the vet sans informed consent kidnapping? Why is the same standard of informed consent not consistently applied to these other cases of human-animal interactions? It is when these obvious inconsistencies are pointed out that the entire framework of informed consent being necessary for human-animal sexual interactions collapses, unless a person is willing to claim that pet ownership as a whole is morally wrong. (A claim that I will not analyze here.)

Hence, it seems far more rational to accept Singer’s utilitarian analysis as valid and to condemn forms of human-animal interactions that cause animals to suffer through the infliction of pain. If we adopt this reasoning, we can justifiably condemn the mistreatment of animals in settings such as factory farms, for instance, but we do not need to adopt an irrational stance on the moral wrongness of sexual interactions between humans and animals, as a deontological standard of informed consent would have us do.

But we have still not addressed the main point of Saletan’s article, that being that there is an inconsistency in Singer’s defense of non-harmful bestiality but lack of a parallel defense of sexual contact with children, a class of individuals presumed to be similarly incapable of offering informed consent to sexual activity. What can we say to that?

Singer was asked this very question in an interview with the journalist William Crawley. His answer was not to claim that sexual contact with animals was not equivalent to sexual contact with children, but rather to claim that there needed to be evidence of children suffering from sexual contact for him to condemn it as morally wrong. As he claimed that he was unfamiliar with the relevant evidence, he refused to answer Crawley’s question. (A wise decision, in light of the fact that his opinions are routinely distorted by negative reviewers.)

Since then, however, Singer has apparently formulated somewhat of a position on the moral status of sexual activity between adults and children. In a July 2007 article entitled Virtual Vices, he writes this regarding the nature of an online role-playing game: “These virtual characters then do things that people in the real world do, such as having sex. Depending on your preferences, you can have sex with someone who is older or younger than you – perhaps much older or younger. In fact, if your virtual character is an adult, you can have sex with a virtual character who is a child. If you did that in the real world, most of us would agree that you did something seriously wrong.” This does not definitively condemn adult-child sex, nor does he offer any arguments in favor of the claim that it is wrong, but it does serve as an indication that he has come to that conclusion.

But is this an inconsistency on his part? To answer the question, we must analyze the nature of the suffering inflicted on animals through harmful sexual contact, and to what extent parallels between that and sexual interactions between children can be drawn. Singer primarily defines suffering inflicted on animals as being characterized by pain and physical injury, writing, “Some men use hens as a sexual object, inserting their penis into the cloaca, an all-purpose channel for wastes and for the passage of the egg. This is usually fatal to the hen, and in some cases she will be deliberately decapitated just before ejaculation in order to intensify the convulsions of its sphincter. This is cruelty, clear and simple.”

He thus condemns such forms of violent and abusive contact on the grounds that there is physical pain involved which causes animals to suffer. This is essentially the only reason he offers for the moral wrongness of some forms of bestiality, and thus does not condemn non-harmful forms. In other contexts, he has condemned the mistreatment of animals on the grounds that there animals not only endure physical pain, but are subject to rudimentary emotional trauma as well. He does not consider this issue here, likely because animals do not experience sexual contact in the same emotional sense that humans do. This critical factor permits us to identify the fundamental difference between sexual contact with animals and sexual contact with children: a future capacity to experience emotional harm in the future by the latter, which would constitute a form of suffering.

Hence, the reason that acceptance of the permissibility of sexual acts with animals cannot directly translate into acceptance of the permissibility of sexual acts with children or (possibly) other classes of beings incapable of offering informed consent to sexual activity is because there is an additional element present in the potential consequences of sexual contact with children that is not present in those of sexual contact with animals, that being the potential for long-term psychological harm in children that could inhibit or damage their future development, and may possibly lead to related social problems later in life. For instance, a general analysis (chosen at random) of studies on such a matter might include Kendal-Tackett et al.’s The Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, the abstract of which notes: “A review of 46 studies clearly demonstrates that sexually abused children have more [negative] symptoms than non-abused children, with abuse accounting for 15 to 45 percent of the variance.” Since an additional criterion of suffering is necessary to analyze in any ethical commentary on the moral nature of sexual interactions with children, it cannot be directly compared to the moral nature of sexual contact with animals.

To be sure, any ethical claim obviously requires some degree of external analysis, and it is likely that there are many more arguments that can be advanced and defended in discussion of the moral nature of bestiality, but Saletan’s criticisms and comparison with adult-child sex are found to be lacking.

For the record, I'm not interested in hearing that bestiality is "disgusting." In my mind, homosexual sex is personally disgusting to me, and I'm repulsed by the thought of penetrating another man, but that says nothing to the ethical status of prohibiting sodomy, for instance.
 
I can't be bothered to read it, but know for a fact it is bullshit and lies.
 
shagging is a dance here in the south....

perhaps you should watch the dvd "zoo" the story of the farm where a man dies having relations with a stallion...mr. hand was his internet nick and i do believe his films are still on the net...
 
Make love, not hamburgers.

I'm not convinced being shagged by a human is not painful or distressing to animals.
 
What does? Did you read it?
I skimmed through it. Too squeamish to give it a good read but it has some interesting points. I would never have thought anyone would use sex with animals as a justification or a slippery slope aregument concerning pedophilia.

Here's a nicer animal tale, (no pun ...):
KENNEBUNKPORT, Maine
Second NYC 140-year-old lobster released
Rather than put it on display, a New York restaurant has decided to release a very large and old lobster into the cold waters off Maine. Nicknamed Craig, the lobster is scheduled to be set free today in Kennebunkport after being turned over to animal rights activists by Halu Japanese Restaurant & Grill in Brooklyn. Craig is estimated to be about the same size and age as George, a 140-year-old, 20-pound lobster put back in the sea in Kennebunkport last month y Manhattan's City Crab and Seafood. Halu had planned to keep Craig on display, but had a change of heart and agreed to let People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals return it to its natural home. (AP)
dingbat_story_end_icon.gif


© Copyright 2009 Globe Newspaper Company.
 
Saletan pointed out that there was an inconsistency between demanding that informed consent be required for sexual activity with animals, while not demanding the same for killing them.

There is, indeed, an inconsistency there. They need to decided whether animals are property or beings with rights. If animals are property, there would be no difference if you killed them or raped them. The current laws against having sex with them probably carried a similar justification as old laws against sodomy at their inception. Personally I find it disgusting, but I'm not much for non-human animal rights at the cost of human rights either.
 
You're right; I never replied to the criticisms of animal rights that you outlined at PF. We'll have to bring that over here sometime.

I don't object to the killing of animals (for legitimate purposes), per se, but inasmuch as I adopt Singer's utilitarian viewpoint regarding animals, my objection would be to causing animals to suffer, and there are certainly types of sexual contact that don't actively cause animals to suffer, such as performing oral sex on them.
 
You're right; I never replied to the criticisms of animal rights that you outlined at PF. We'll have to bring that over here sometime.

I don't object to the killing of animals (for legitimate purposes), per se, but inasmuch as I adopt Singer's utilitarian viewpoint regarding animals, my objection would be to causing animals to suffer, and there are certainly types of sexual contact that don't actively cause animals to suffer, such as performing oral sex on them.

It's hard to say what is meant by animal suffering. Many people try to put themselves in the animals shoes, but this doesn't work because we don't know if they suffer like us and to what extent. This thread's first post says that child abuse is distinct from bestiality in that children are likely to suffer psychological trauma down the road (albeit a byproduct of a disconnect between what society deems right and their experience), and that makes child abuse incomparable with bestiality. I'd agree.

But then how do we balance the suffering of humans and other animals? After all, if some little boy shoots a hummingbird for fun, sending him to prison would cause a great deal of human suffering for both the boy and his family. How many hummingbird lives would it take to outweigh that cost? What if it were a dog, a cat, or a cow? Normally those would be treated as property offenses if the animals belonged to somebody much like vandalizing somebody's car. But we know that cows experience pain while cars don't... Nevertheless, in my mind human suffering matters more than animal suffering. Perhaps I'm speciesist. :)
 

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