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The Enemy in Iraq
Violence is likely to get worse between now and America's Election Day.
Saturday, September 18, 2004 12:01 a.m.
Violence is spiking again in Iraq, and U.S. officials are warning that it is going to get worse before it gets better. So now is a good moment to sort out where we are in Iraq, and more important, to remember who precisely our enemy is.
The first thing to stress is that Iraq is not in "chaos," nor is there some general uprising against either Coalition forces or the interim government led by Ayad Allawi. If that were true, the violence would be far worse. The latest CIA assessment is negative, at least according to the spin of this week's news leaks, but given the agency's track record in Iraq that estimate may or may not be accurate. One clear CIA mistake has been its predictions of communal or religious fighting; the striking thing is how little Sunni vs. Shiite, or Kurd vs. Arab, violence there has been so far.
The second crucial point is that the Shiite majority remains committed both to elections and to a pluralistic Iraq. The moderate Grand Ayatollah Sistani is the recognized Shiite authority in Iraq, as his role in negotiating the recent Najaf ceasefire shows, and he has explicitly rejected the Iranian model of religious government.
In Najaf, recent demonstrations were held to blame not the Americans but rebel cleric Muqtada al-Sadr for the recent violence there. Al-Sadr's followers are mostly underemployed young men who can be co-opted into the political process once they're convinced that America intends to honor its promise to hold elections. Al-Sadr himself still needs to be arrested or killed, but the way to neutralize his support is to show progress toward the January polls.
So who are we fighting? The answer is a combination of Saddam Hussein's former Fedayeen, intelligence services and other Baathists, as well as jihadists led by the long-time Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al Zarqawi. The extent of their cooperation is unknown, but they certainly share the same immediate goal of promoting violence--both random, and precisely targeted against Iraqis who work with the Coalition--to drive the Americans out and create enough mayhem so they can take over.
Regarding the Baathists, it's safe to say that the U.S., and especially the CIA, underestimated both their strategy and ruthlessness. In retrospect, the current guerrilla campaign probably was the Saddam strategy all along, starting with those raids in Nasiriyah on the invasion route to Baghdad.
As long ago as April 2003 we were hearing talk of a so-called "Party of Return," or attempt by the Baath Party to go underground and slowly undermine work toward a free Iraq. Coalition forces have found documents, also dating from the immediate post-invasion period in 2003, outlining a detailed plan for the efforts, including the establishment of Fallujah as a staging area with weapons caches and hideouts. The Bush Administration ought to release those documents to enhance American understanding of who our troops are fighting. These are bitter-enders who will never surrender and have to be killed.
As for the jihadists, their goal is the establishment of a Taliban-like regime in Iraq, or at least stopping the spread of liberal social and political ideas in the Middle East. Long before the war in Iraq, Zarqawi was linked to terror in Jordan, Georgia and London. The infamous January memo intercepted on its way from Zarqawi to al Qaeda commanders makes this clear: "Blood has to be spilled. For those who are good, we will speed up their trip to paradise, and the others, we will get rid of them."
The Zarqawi memo also reveals how much recent developments have been the product of a deliberate plan rather than a popular revolt. It talks of using the Sunni Triangle as a sanctuary, and of targeting the Shiite community with car bombs, along with Iraq's "bastard government." Stopping the creation of Iraqi security forces appears to be Zarqawi's primary aim. "How can we kill their cousins and sons and under what pretext," he asks, "after the Americans start withdrawing?" This week's attack on the recruiting station in Baghdad and on a group of Iraqi police to the north shows that strategy at work.
The refuge for both of these groups is the Sunni Triangle, and especially the city of Fallujah. Our softly-softly attempts to handle the Sunni Triangle through outreach to local leaders may have been a reasonable gamble. But the problem is that we've been unable to protect and reassure the many Sunnis who would, all things being equal, choose our side. The recent murder of a leading Iraqi National Guard officer in Fallujah is one of too many tragic examples.
The start-stop battle of Fallujah this April was a mistake, and has left that city as a staging area for attacks in Baghdad in particular. At least the White House now seems to appreciate its error. U.S. commanders have lately been given the green light to attack Tal Afar, a mini-Fallujah near the Syrian border, with military success. A recent deal to allow U.S. and Iraqi forces to pacify Samarra, another Sunni city, also has potential. Donald Rumsfeld has said that other targets may have to wait until more Iraqi troops can be trained, and that makes sense if we have the time. Former commander of the 101st Airborne, Major-General David Petraeus, is making notable progress on the training front, but most of his Iraqis are still some months away from being an effective force.
Meantime, our enemies will continue to do whatever damage they can. They can read the U.S. election calendar as well as al Qaeda read Spain's, and their hope is to create precisely the appearance of "chaos" that American critics of the war are broadcasting for their own partisan purposes. It hasn't helped that many prominent Democrats, including recently John Kerry, are giving the impression that they will start to pull out as early as six months from taking office. Iraqis of all kinds have heard that too. As we've said, we think the stronger Kerry ground, on politics and substance, would be to criticize President Bush for not prosecuting the war fiercely enough. But the Senator doesn't seem capable of making that argument.
The Fallujah sanctuary has left the timing of engagements up to the enemy, so we can expect more car bombing and mortar attacks from now to November. We understand that some parts of the Bush Administration are wary of provoking more violence before the election. But what would be truly damaging politically aren't further troubles in Iraq by themselves, but any perception that we aren't really fighting to win.
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