Muslims Brotherhood's Nazi ties

[Avatar4321]

How come we didn't really hear anything about the Muslim Brotherhood's Nazi ties when the media was going on about them in the Egyptian riots?

 

[daveman]

Because President Obama has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.

 

[Zona]

Greatest thread ever.

 

[Jroc]

The muslim brotherhood will take over Egypt, The Radical islamist will also run Yemen soon it's not looking good in the mideast right now.

[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=82e4jeuEwec]YouTube - ‪Egypt : Attacks on Coptic Christians‬‏[/ame]

 

[Lars]

Because President Obama has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Which by using Glen Beck logic connects Obama to the Nazis.

 

[Ancient lion]

This thread is really a funny one.

 

[daveman]

Because President Obama has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Which by using Glen Beck logic connects Obama to the Nazis.

Good thing I don't use Glenn Beck logic, huh?

 

[Sunni Man]

Oh I get it.

This is like the Six Degrees of Kevin bacon.

Nazis - Brotherhood - Israel - Jews - Hollywood - Kevin Bacon


Hey that was fun!!!

Let's do another one.

 

[Douger]

Yepp.
Your masters hand in hand.

 

[waltky]

Islamist threat to democracy being diluted through plurality...

The new Islamist scene in Egypt
The more democracy gains hold in Egypt, the more fragmented will be the Islamist political scene, writes Khalil El-Anani

I have intentionally refrained from writing about the state of Islamism in the post-25 January period, preferring instead to wait until the dust settled and the contours of the new political map became visible. Yet while it is premature to issue categorical judgements on how recent developments will affect the shape and future of political Islam in Egypt, it is nevertheless possible to make certain observations on the new Islamist scene in Egypt.

Perhaps the most immediately striking feature of this scene is its considerable plurality and diversity, to the degree that one gains an impression of intense fragmentation. By plurality, I refer to both the organisational and the ideological dimensions. The organisational aspect is one of the legacies of the lack of political horizons under the Mubarak regime, which closed off public space to the development and diversification of political Islam, effectively reducing it to two chief trends. The first of these was pragmatist and pacifist, compelled to play by the rules of the game set by the Mubarak regime and whose agenda, rhetoric and actions were restricted by the threshold set by government authorities. This trend consisted of the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis and independent Islamists. The second is the radical trend that confronted the regime through recourse to violence but failed to accomplish its aims due to heavy and sustained assault by the security forces. It eventually buckled under the pressure and its leaders issued ideological retractions, renouncing violence and the recourse to arms as a means to obtain political ends. This "compulsory" duality contributed to distorting the perception of political Islam. It engendered the public perception that to belong to any Islamist group, even a moderate one, was to oppose and enter into conflict with the government. The perception repelled many potential partisans who preferred to remain in the non-politicised religious space.

The post-25 January Revolution phase triggered something of an "explosion" in religiously inspired political formations. Political participation now became the preferred course of most members of Islamist groups and trends, including those that had formerly rejected and, perhaps, condemned political participation and political party activity on religious and ideological grounds. Many Salafis and Jihadists, for example, now see participatory democratic politics as the best avenue to advance their religious and political projects and to obtain legitimacy in the public sphere. Meanwhile, for the first time in its history, the Muslim Brotherhood founded a political party. In spite of the many reservations that have been aired with regard to the lack of transparency that surrounded the establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party, it still marks a turning point in the process of the assimilation of the Muslim Brothers into political life. The Salafis, for their part, have founded two new political parties so far -- Al-Nour (Light) and Al-Fadila (Virtue). There is a good likelihood of more Salafist parties to come, especially given the considerable fluidity that characterises that trend at present. But perhaps the greater surprise comes from the former Jihadist trend (Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya and the Egyptian Jihad) whose leaders are also now inclined to participate politically through the aegis of a political party. Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya (which has been exhibiting a clear drive to engage in public political life since the recent release of its leaders from prison) has chosen Tareq Al-Zomor, once charged with the assassination of president Anwar El-Sadat, to represent the party's founders, who also include Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya leaders and former militants Safwat Abdel-Ghani and Mahmoud Taha. El-Zomor was among those recently released from prison, as was his relative Aboud El-Zomor.

The Egyptian Jihad's political party project is the Peace and Development Party, which is to be headed by the well-known scholar and former Jihad leader Kamal Habib. At the same time, an amorphous group of individuals that call themselves "independent Islamists" are also in the process of creating political parties. One project -- Al-Tawhid Al-Arabi (Arab Unification) Party -- is an extension (or perhaps breakaway faction) of the Islamic Action Party whose application has been frozen since the mid-1990s. Another is the Egyptian Change and Development Party, founded by a group of individuals who describe themselves as Islamist in the cultural sense. The proliferation of Islamist parties and party projects after the revolution has simultaneously brought a boom in the intellectual, ideological and rhetorical diversity in the Islamist scene. No longer can the conventional dualities (moderate/extremist, Muslim Brotherhood/Salafi, fundamentalist/jihadist) serve to depict the shades of the current scene. More appropriate would be to describe some as having "civil" or liberal tendencies and others as traditional or conservative. Certainly, there have been radical transformations in the political, ideological and doctrinal discourses of these movements.

More Al-Ahram Weekly | Opinion | The new Islamist scene in Egypt