Military Transformation- Mission Not Yet Accomplished

[NATO AIR]

some good points, especially at the end about what is lacking in vision and planning. as always though, i love to hear the comments of army and marine vets who have far better understanding of this than i do and can provide clarity and sense to articles like these....

http://www.slate.com/id/2108400/

Rumsfeld's Legacy
"Military transformation"? Mission not-yet-accomplished.
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Tuesday, Oct. 19, 2004, at 4:20 PM PT

The Transformer? Not quite.

An article in last Sunday's New York Times, musing on which Cabinet officers might stay or leave in a hypothetical second Bush term, reported that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld would like to remain, in part to avoid the appearance of admitting guilt over Abu Ghraib and other catastrophes, but also for another reason. As the piece put it: "He also wants to stay until his main legacy—the transformation of the military—is well under way."

The striking thing about this sentence is that Rumsfeld has done so little to push this legacy in the four years that he's been in office. Another puzzle worth contemplating: Given the quagmire that Iraq has become in the 18 months after the genuinely stunning battlefield victory, is Rumsfeld's brand of transformation—even if it were put in place—the sort of transformation that the U.S. armed forces really need?

"Military transformation"—remember the phrase? It was all the rage in the spring of '03. It's a theory of warfare that envisioned lighter, faster, more agile, yet also more lethal combat forces. And it seemed vindicated by the back-to-back toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan and then of Saddam in Iraq.

The theory took hold in certain quarters of the Pentagon in the mid-1980s, with the development of new "precision-guided munitions"—popularly known as "smart bombs"—that could destroy enemy targets with a single shot, as opposed to the dozens of attempts required in olden times. Some analysts realized that these PGMs—combined with higher-resolution intelligence sensors and more rapid communications networks—meant victory could be achieved with much smaller forces. We wouldn't need so much heavy armor and artillery, for example, if enemy forces could be knocked out from the air. Since armor and artillery require elaborate and usually sluggish supply lines, armies could now take the offensive more quickly and potently, bursting through the holes in enemy defenses, then surprising, surrounding, and killing the enemy troops that remain before moving on to the next face-off.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—at least in the initial battlefield phases—fit this pattern of transformation, and Rumsfeld deserves credit for making it so.

However, transformation is a concept not just for military operations but also for military budgets and institutions. It was always assumed that the new style of operations could not be sustained for long without a vast overhaul of the Pentagon itself. This latter overhaul Rumsfeld has barely begun to undertake. At the start of the Bush presidency, Rumsfeld seemed clear on what had to be done. In his "quadrennial defense review" of 2001, he wrote that without such a transformation in management, mission priorities, and weapons procurement, "the current defense program will only become more expensive to maintain over time," and we will "forfeit many of the opportunities" that the new technologies have made possible.

Three years later, that's exactly what has happened. The military establishment has become more expensive to maintain—its budget has risen from $362 billion to $420 billion (not including the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan)—but the extra money has purchased little in the way of "transformational" combat power.

Rumsfeld has changed a few things. He canceled the Army's Comanche helicopter. With the enthusiastic backing of President Bush, he's added billions of dollars to missile defense. And he has purchased a lot of drones and smart bombs. Beyond that, in the words of a report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments—a Washington think tank directed by Andrew Krepinevich, a former Pentagon official who invented the phrase "military transformation"—Rumsfeld's programs "fairly closely resemble those of previous years and the plan … inherited from the Clinton administration."

Nearly all the big-ticket items in the fiscal year 2005 military budget—which a House-Senate conference committee approved this month—have nothing to do with transformation, nothing to do with any threat on the horizon. Look at them:

$4.1 billion for 24 F-22 stealth fighter planes—at a time when our prospective enemies can barely fly fighter planes, much less shoot down our non-stealth aircraft;

$4.3 billion for continued development of the F-35 Joint Strategic Fighter, a smaller version of the F-22;

$2 billion for a new "Super Hornet" version of the F/A-18 fighter plane;

$2.3 billion for a new Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, at a time when our Navy faces virtually no threat and possesses more subs than it knows what to do with.
The list could go on. (Click here if you want it to.)

Military operations are now run through joint commands—i.e., as interservice endeavors. (U.S. Central Command, or Centcomm, which ran the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, is one of these joint enterprises.) But military budgets are still devised, weapons are still purchased, and priorities are still set by the individual services—Army, Air Force, and Navy. (The Marines are part of the Navy, but they've been allowed increasing autonomy on these matters.) Overall military budgets have gone up and down, at varying rates, over the past 20 years—but none of the services has had its apple cart toppled.

For instance, look at the three services' allocations in the FY 2005 military budget that Congress just passed. The Army received $114 billion, the Navy $123 billion, and the Air Force $124 billion. (The total sum, $361 billion, does not include money for other Defense Department agencies or for the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons divisions.) This amounts to 32 percent for the Army, 34 percent for the Navy, 34 percent for the Air Force.

Now look at the Pentagon's archive for fiscal year 1994, the Clinton administration's first military budget. The relative shares are nearly identical: 30 percent for the Army, 36 percent for the Navy, 34 percent for the Air Force.

In fact, go back to fiscal year 1984. It's 29 percent for the Army, 35 percent for the Navy, 36 percent for the Air Force. Go back to nearly any year in the past quarter-century, and you'll see the same pattern. This is no coincidence. This reflects an informal accord among the service chiefs on how to divvy up the budget, and anyone who disturbs this arrangement can count on unleashing a storm of backbiting dissent and bureaucratic warfare.

In short, partly for reasons beyond the control of all but the most tenacious defense secretaries (and it looks as though Rumsfeld, for all his bluster, will not join those ranks), "military transformation" has not begun to gain a grip on the bowels of the Pentagon.

But let's take another look at where the theory, to some degree, has been put into practice—in actual military tactics and operations. The question, to put it on the table again: Is this the right sort of transformation? It worked in Iraq and Afghanistan as long as the mission was to plow into opposing armies and topple a regime. However, the current mission is what the military calls "security and stabilization operations." And the doctrine of transformation seems to have no bearing on this phase of conflict whatsoever.

The point of transformation is to fight mobile, high-tech wars with fewer troops. Yet, as everyone has by now recognized, occupying, securing, and stabilizing conquered territory is a fairly static, decidedly low-tech enterprise that requires almost nothing but troops—the more, the better.

There's a false nomenclature, used by officials and critics alike, about the war in Iraq. It is misleading to say that we're in danger of "winning the war but losing the peace." We are not embroiled in some "postwar" operation. We're still embroiled in a war—the same war that started in March 2003.

One of the saddest stories about this war was told in a Knight-Ridder piece this past weekend. Shortly before the invasion of Iraq got underway last year, a group of military and intelligence officers met at Shaw Air Force Base in South Carolina to watch a slide show that laid out the details of the finished war plan. The final slide was the shocker. Labeled "Phase 4-C" (meaning the phase for security and stabilization), the slide read: "To be provided."


It's not that Rumsfeld had no plan to win the peace. He had no plan to win the war.

This is not to put the onus entirely on Rumsfeld. The U.S. Army used to have large units specializing in civil affairs and military police. They dwindled in size and importance during the Cold War, when the strategy of war-fighting became subordinate to the business of weapons procurement. It has also been a very long time since any branch of the armed forces published a field manual on post-combat operations. At the end of an Army war game played in 2002, retired Gen. Huba Wass de Czege—one of the game's managers—wrote a memo complaining that the players finished the game before it was really over. They confused triumph on the battlefield with the accomplishment of strategic objectives. It's a common mistake in these war games, Gen. Wass de Czege wrote, which "tend to devote more attention to successful campaign-beginnings than to successful conclusions." A few months later, the real commanders would make the same mistake in the real war.

And so, Rumsfeld or whoever replaces him needs to think about a different sort of transformation, one that emphasizes better planning, training, mobilizing, and equipping for the kinds of wars we're really fighting now.

Fred Kaplan writes the "War Stories" column for Slate.

 

[dmp]

The striking thing about this sentence is that Rumsfeld has done so little to push this legacy in the four years that he's been in office.

Wow...that statement is NOT based on reality. In fact, the army has made Signifigant steps in various areas of transforming into a more lethal fighting force. In 2002 - within the four-year window cited above, the army has stood up TWO STRYKER Brigades; One currently in Iraq doing GREAT things, the other lined up to take it's place.

Given the quagmire that Iraq has become in the 18 months after the genuinely stunning battlefield victory, is Rumsfeld's brand of transformation—even if it were put in place—the sort of transformation that the U.S. armed forces really need?

This statement is flawed - there is no quagmire in Iraq. The planning and actions taking place in our Army today are more rapid-paced that at any time since I became affiliated with the Army, May 6, 1992.

"Military transformation"—remember the phrase? It was all the rage in the spring of '03. It's a theory of warfare that envisioned lighter, faster, more agile, yet also more lethal combat forces. And it seemed vindicated by the back-to-back toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan and then of Saddam in Iraq.

Uh...spring of 03? That's 18 months ago. lol..dude writes it to seem like it was 20 years ago. Operations like Iraq and Afghanistan are validating the need for rapid, urban-friendly forces - the later more so in Iraq. Keep in mind, the new lighter, faster force isn't designed to replace the Heavy Armor brigades; but to do work in areas not easily accessable via 60 ton tanks.

However, transformation is a concept not just for military operations but also for military budgets and institutions

The way the Army names and allocated dollars 'has' changed, dramatically. In a nutshell, most army spending can be broken down into 'mission' or 'operation' dollars. Today, the Army uses a centralized 'operation-dollars' organization to streamline how the Army spends it's money on each base; making roads, buildings, and such. The 'mission' dollars still stream from the same sources - largely Forces Command, in Atlanta, GA. There are more knowledgable "Budget" dudes here who could provide more input.

Three years later, that's exactly what has happened. The military establishment has become more expensive to maintain—its budget has risen from $362 billion to $420 billion (not including the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan)—but the extra money has purchased little in the way of "transformational" combat power.

Does the author of this piece have a 'focking CLUE' on how much money it takes to stand up unique Brigades such as we have today? It's not just buying new STRYKERS - that's a small part of hte problem. We have to train thousands of troops, Mechanics, and Leaders in not just 'where' to employ their weapon systems, etc, but 'how best to'.

The article goes on, but become more and more editorializing what's happening; that's impossible to debate. I can tell you from a 'Fort Lewis, and 1st (US) Corps perspective, not just the way we fight is changing, but where and for how long. Big things are afoot...stay tuned.

 

[MJDuncan1982]

This statement is flawed - there is no quagmire in Iraq.

I'd have to disagree with you that Iraq is not a quagmire. It appears to me that it is.

However, anyone of the official (military or governmental) definition of a quagmire? (a.k.a. - not out of a normal dictionary)

 

[dmp]

I'd have to disagree with you that Iraq is not a quagmire. It appears to me that it is.

However, anyone of the official (military or governmental) definition of a quagmire? (a.k.a. - not out of a normal dictionary)

I agree with the Webster's definition - in that sense, evey war we fight - every conflict is a quagmire:

A difficult or precarious situation; a predicament.

 

[MJDuncan1982]

I agree with the Webster's definition - in that sense, evey war we fight - every conflict is a quagmire:

See, it doesn't seem that that is how it is used by people in the government, media and military.

I remember Rumsfeld vehemently denying we are in a quagmire but if you use the Webster version it is obvious that every war is.

There is some other definition that is more commonly used.

 

[5stringJeff]

This article is trash. The Army is in full-blown transformation, not just in the creation of six Stryker (medium) brigades, but with the reorganization of forces. The JTF is a plane that can be used by all three flying services (i.e. Navy, AF, and Marines), making the military more of a "joint" force.
And the author complains that we are building new submarines and fighters when our enemies don't have/use such technology. Should we fall behind in military technology, then? Is that really what he's suggesting?

What a load of bunk. This person obviously has no clue what the military is doing to transform.

And oh, by the way, Army transformation started in 2000, three years before it became "all the rage" during Iraq. I should know; I was in the first Stryker brigade for almost three years.

 

[CSM]

The Army's transformation involves a lot more than just weapons. It also involves command and control, doctrine, intelligence and analysis and so forth. There is virtually nothing in the military that is not undergoing some kind of transformation. I know, it's what I do for a living now.

 

[dmp]

The Army's transformation involves a lot more than just weapons. It also involves command and control, doctrine, intelligence and analysis and so forth. There is virtually nothing in the military that is not undergoing some kind of transformation. I know, it's what I do for a living now.

Are you a DA Employee or DA Contractor?

 

[CSM]

Are you a DA Employee or DA Contractor?

Neither. I work for a Federally Funded Research and Development Center(FFRDC). I work Joint integration issues between the US Air Force and the other services (particularly Army) regarding both current and future systems and operations. Fun job but lots of travel here in the States as well as overseas.

 

[Merlin1047]

Kaplan needs to apply for a job at 60 minutes. His distortions are only matched by his sloppy research. He either chooses to ignore or has absolutely no idea how long it takes to get an item of equipment from concept to final approval. Equipment is designed and developed with the best foresight available based on current cirsumstance. Who would have envisioned the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union? Certainly no Democrat would have. Had a the president been some Democrat instead of Ronald Reagan, the Soviet Union would be alive and well today and probably a bigger threat than ever.

Kaplan is also guilty of wearing his blinders when he bitches about particular items of equipment:
"Nearly all the big-ticket items in the fiscal year 2005 military budget—which a House-Senate conference committee approved this month—have nothing to do with transformation, nothing to do with any threat on the horizon. Look at them:

$4.1 billion for 24 F-22 stealth fighter planes—at a time when our prospective enemies can barely fly fighter planes, much less shoot down our non-stealth aircraft;

$4.3 billion for continued development of the F-35 Joint Strategic Fighter, a smaller version of the F-22;

$2 billion for a new "Super Hornet" version of the F/A-18 fighter plane;

$2.3 billion for a new Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, at a time when our Navy faces virtually no threat and possesses more subs than it knows what to do with."

First, keep in mind that stealth technology was under development at least as far back as Reagan. Second, Kaplan somehow ignores the potential threat from the Chinese and the North Koreans. There are other nations in the world who could be potential foes over the next twenty years. France, India, Iran, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc. Some of these have sophisticated equipment and would present a significant challenge.

We cannot forsee what the future will bring. The only thing we can do is try not to get caught flat-footed - as we have been at times in the past.

 

[NATO AIR]

i appreciate the candid analysis of the article, its good to hear several sides and learn the big picture, and you all definitely provide that.

from a squid's POV, may i ask these questions? (my ignorance of army will show)

1) the navy is severely lacking in anti-submarine ability at this point, at a time when submarines are an increasing danger from foes like China, Iran and North Korea. Why is my Navy not urgently tackling this so it can be correctly addressed within months, not years?

2) the army, IMHO, needs another 100-200,000 troops, how can we pay for this and all these other weapons systems at the same time?

3) a generation issue... what is the eventual replacement for the f-22 raptor? is one in concept yet or? it would seem to make sense to me to abandon the raptor (due to the AF also getting the JSF in less than 3-4 years) if a suitable upgrade was being designed and could be deployed in 7-10 years, that way the air force's new superjet would be truly top of the line.

4) the JSF is great! sorry not a question..

5) what is our eventual replacement for b-52's (which have been kicking ass in every war)

6) wouldn't it make sense to start training and equipping a rapid reaction force with soldiers and police from our allies to deploy to places like darfur and afghanistan in the future, so as not to burden the US military all the time?

7) WTF is a stryker division? i hear about this all the time from you guys....

 

[dmp]

2) the army, IMHO, needs another 100-200,000 troops, how can we pay for this and all these other weapons systems at the same time?

Why does the Army need 100K more troops? The Army is gaining 20-30K more as-is...

what is our eventual replacement for b-52's (which have been kicking ass in every war)

There isn't one. ...if it ain't broke....

6) wouldn't it make sense to start training and equipping a rapid reaction force with soldiers and police from our allies to deploy to places like darfur and afghanistan in the future, so as not to burden the US military all the time?

See Question number 7 - fwiw, the Military does have what you describe, but as a part of NATO - Allied Rapid Reactionary Team; or something like that.

7) WTF is a stryker division? i hear about this all the time from you guys....

Stryker Brigades are made up of what we used to call light or mech infantry - sort of in the middle. They are designed to put 'boots on ground' within a very short time, in the event of a crisis. Thinnly armored/lightly armed "STRYKER" vehicles are the mode of transport for the troops. These vehicles can achieve freeway speeds, and don't require much in the way of infrastructure - they dont break apart roads, bridges, etc., as heavy tracked vehicles can.

 

[CSM]

i appreciate the candid analysis of the article, its good to hear several sides and learn the big picture, and you all definitely provide that.

from a squid's POV, may i ask these questions? (my ignorance of army will show)

1) the navy is severely lacking in anti-submarine ability at this point, at a time when submarines are an increasing danger from foes like China, Iran and North Korea. Why is my Navy not urgently tackling this so it can be correctly addressed within months, not years?

2) the army, IMHO, needs another 100-200,000 troops, how can we pay for this and all these other weapons systems at the same time?

3) a generation issue... what is the eventual replacement for the f-22 raptor? is one in concept yet or? it would seem to make sense to me to abandon the raptor (due to the AF also getting the JSF in less than 3-4 years) if a suitable upgrade was being designed and could be deployed in 7-10 years, that way the air force's new superjet would be truly top of the line.

4) the JSF is great! sorry not a question..

5) what is our eventual replacement for b-52's (which have been kicking ass in every war)

6) wouldn't it make sense to start training and equipping a rapid reaction force with soldiers and police from our allies to deploy to places like darfur and afghanistan in the future, so as not to burden the US military all the time?

7) WTF is a stryker division? i hear about this all the time from you guys....

1) The Naval Warfare Development Center down in Newport RI has been working on Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) for some time now. HUge efforts and programs underway as we speak. There is some pretty neat stuff (mostly classified) in development and being fielded.

2) Army transformation is working on it and if the technology is there, we wont need that many more troops. My analogy would be: If you have a limited number of bullets in your weapon, it is better to ensure each bullet hits a critical target where it will do the most good than to spray as many bullets as you can and hope you hit something. This philosophy is akin to the use of precision guided munitions (PGMs) employed by most of the services. If we place what troops we have on the ground where they will do the most good, we wont need as many troops.

3) Space plane.

4) yep

5) Good question!

6) UN, EU and NATO are all attempting to do just that. the problem is that none of those organizations always have US interests at heart.

7) Stryker brigades are the interim solution to Army transformation to what the Army is currently calling the Unit of Action (UA). UA as planned will be a combined arms force with plug and play components (weeapons, units, vehicles, etc.) that can be tailored to a specific situation.

 

[Merlin1047]

1) The Naval Warfare Development Center down in Newport RI has been working on Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) for some time now. HUge efforts and programs underway as we speak. There is some pretty neat stuff (mostly classified) in development and being fielded.

2) Army transformation is working on it and if the technology is there, we wont need that many more troops. My analogy would be: If you have a limited number of bullets in your weapon, it is better to ensure each bullet hits a critical target where it will do the most good than to spray as many bullets as you can and hope you hit something. This philosophy is akin to the use of precision guided munitions (PGMs) employed by most of the services. If we place what troops we have on the ground where they will do the most good, we wont need as many troops.

3) Space plane.

4) yep

5) Good question!

6) UN, EU and NATO are all attempting to do just that. the problem is that none of those organizations always have US interests at heart.

7) Stryker brigades are the interim solution to Army transformation to what the Army is currently calling the Unit of Action (UA). UA as planned will be a combined arms force with plug and play components (weeapons, units, vehicles, etc.) that can be tailored to a specific situation.

CSM this is all well and good, but it does not fit with the military philosophy of turning more functions over to a civilian contractor. Eventually, I see that the next war will be submitted to contractors as a request for proposal and it will be bid upon by competing companies. After it's over, the army can show up for the parade.

Toward that end, I have a business opportunity which may interest you. I have found a source of cheap, but highly effective warriors which can supplant the military in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.

My plan is simply to recruit a couple thousand good old boys from down home. For vehicles, I plan to equip them with red Dodge Ram pickup trucks with the biggest hemi they make. We'll arm them with Remington 12 gauge shotguns, fifty sticks of dynamite and bows and arrows. For rations support we'll only need some cans of beanie-weenies, pork rinds and several cases of Budweiser per individual. For R&R we'll just airdrop the latest issue of Hustler and pouches of Red Man chewing tobacco. Uniform will be Levis, tank tops and John Deere hats.

We give the guys a two week indoctrination which includes telling them that moslems hate Wal-Mart and plan to destroy the chain. Then we drop them off in Iraq, tell them that terrorists taste like chicken and turn the boys loose.

What do you think? I think we can tell the Air Force, Navy and Army to start packing their stuff.

The only problem I can forsee is getting the boys to come back when we want them to.

:firing:

:teeth:

 

[NATO AIR]

1) The Naval Warfare Development Center down in Newport RI has been working on Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) for some time now. HUge efforts and programs underway as we speak. There is some pretty neat stuff (mostly classified) in development and being fielded.

2) Army transformation is working on it and if the technology is there, we wont need that many more troops. My analogy would be: If you have a limited number of bullets in your weapon, it is better to ensure each bullet hits a critical target where it will do the most good than to spray as many bullets as you can and hope you hit something. This philosophy is akin to the use of precision guided munitions (PGMs) employed by most of the services. If we place what troops we have on the ground where they will do the most good, we wont need as many troops.

3) Space plane.

4) yep

5) Good question!

6) UN, EU and NATO are all attempting to do just that. the problem is that none of those organizations always have US interests at heart.

7) Stryker brigades are the interim solution to Army transformation to what the Army is currently calling the Unit of Action (UA). UA as planned will be a combined arms force with plug and play components (weeapons, units, vehicles, etc.) that can be tailored to a specific situation.

stryker sounds bad ass.... i'm glad the army is getting smarter, better and lighter. i still think we need a good number of increased troops for more MP, intel and civil affairs/peacekeeping positions, but i may be wrong.

now this may be a stupid question again, my ? about the f-22 boils down to this... if we started designing that thing in the late 80's/early 90's, how well will it do against a chinese/russian fighter that was started in the early 21st century? it seems to me we should already be thinking way ahead of everybody else and designing a true 21st century fighter. i just wonder how good the f-22 will be.

thank you CSM, Merlin and --D-- for your answers

 

[CSM]

CSM this is all well and good, but it does not fit with the military philosophy of turning more functions over to a civilian contractor. Eventually, I see that the next war will be submitted to contractors as a request for proposal and it will be bid upon by competing companies. After it's over, the army can show up for the parade.

Toward that end, I have a business opportunity which may interest you. I have found a source of cheap, but highly effective warriors which can supplant the military in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.

My plan is simply to recruit a couple thousand good old boys from down home. For vehicles, I plan to equip them with red Dodge Ram pickup trucks with the biggest hemi they make. We'll arm them with Remington 12 gauge shotguns, fifty sticks of dynamite and bows and arrows. For rations support we'll only need some cans of beanie-weenies, pork rinds and several cases of Budweiser per individual. For R&R we'll just airdrop the latest issue of Hustler and pouches of Red Man chewing tobacco. Uniform will be Levis, tank tops and John Deere hats.

We give the guys a two week indoctrination which includes telling them that moslems hate Wal-Mart and plan to destroy the chain. Then we drop them off in Iraq, tell them that terrorists taste like chicken and turn the boys loose.

What do you think? I think we can tell the Air Force, Navy and Army to start packing their stuff.

The only problem I can forsee is getting the boys to come back when we want them to.

:firing:

:teeth:

Contractor support is so stinking high because the techno geeks build systems that require a PhD to operate. One of my biggest battles is trying to convince the techies that just because it works in a lab doesn't mean it will work in the field. Usually I end up making them trying to operate their system hunkered down on the floor while I shoot paper clips out of a rubber band at them.

I like your plan but you need to get Dunkin Donuts thrown in there someplace.

 

[dmp]

Keep in mind, we aren't doing away with M1 Tanks, and other heavy Armour...