Military Officer: Afghanistan War Shows 'Absence Of Success Virtually Every Level'...

[paulitician]

In a rare insight into the front lines of America’s ten-year war in Afghanistan, an article in Armed Forces Journal by a career officer and three-war veteran says that official reports that conditions in Afghanistan are improving are false, hopes to establish proficient local governments and a self-sufficient Afghan military are fleeting, and the United States’ war effort can be characterized by “the absence of success on virtually every level.”

Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis arrived in Afghanistan in 2010. It didn’t take long, he writes, to notice “little to no evidence the local governments were able to provide for the basic needs of the people.”

“Some of the Afghan civilians I talked with,” he writes, “said the people didn’t want to be connected to a predatory or incapable local government. … From time to time, I observed Afghan Security forces collude with the insurgency.”

March 2010′s official report from the Department of Defense tells a different tale. “The government of Afghanistan’s authority,” it reads, “had been successfully extended and development projects were ongoing, including… the establishment of enduring [Afghan National Police] checkpoints and police stations for permanent presence of Afghan governance and rule of law.”

The disconnect between the official report and Lt. Col. Davis’ accounts are striking. Members of Congress, Lt. Col. Davis alleges, have decided to keep some statements from the public and the war lacks transparency. The spin, he writes, appears to illuminate a pathway to success while the full picture remains a mystery.


Read more: Afghanistan War | US officials | The Daily Caller

 

[zzzz]

It would be nice for you to link the original article instead of spin article. It only takes a few seconds to backtrack to the original.

Truth, lies and Afghanistan - February 2012 - Armed Forces Journal - Military Strategy, Global Defense Strategy

I spent last year in Afghanistan, visiting and talking with U.S. troops and their Afghan partners. My duties with the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force took me into every significant area where our soldiers engage the enemy. Over the course of 12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces.

What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground.

Entering this deployment, I was sincerely hoping to learn that the claims were true: that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that the local government and military were progressing toward self-sufficiency. I did not need to witness dramatic improvements to be reassured, but merely hoped to see evidence of positive trends, to see companies or battalions produce even minimal but sustainable progress.

Instead, I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level.

My arrival in country in late 2010 marked the start of my fourth combat deployment, and my second in Afghanistan. A Regular Army officer in the Armor Branch, I served in Operation Desert Storm, in Afghanistan in 2005-06 and in Iraq in 2008-09. In the middle of my career, I spent eight years in the U.S. Army Reserve and held a number of civilian jobs — among them, legislative correspondent for defense and foreign affairs for Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas.

As a representative for the Rapid Equipping Force, I set out to talk to our troops about their needs and their circumstances. Along the way, I conducted mounted and dismounted combat patrols, spending time with conventional and Special Forces troops. I interviewed or had conversations with more than 250 soldiers in the field, from the lowest-ranking 19-year-old private to division commanders and staff members at every echelon. I spoke at length with Afghan security officials, Afghan civilians and a few village elders.

I saw the incredible difficulties any military force would have to pacify even a single area of any of those provinces; I heard many stories of how insurgents controlled virtually every piece of land beyond eyeshot of a U.S. or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) base.

 

[paulitician]

It would be nice for you to link the original article instead of spin article. It only takes a few seconds to backtrack to the original.

Truth, lies and Afghanistan - February 2012 - Armed Forces Journal - Military Strategy, Global Defense Strategy

I spent last year in Afghanistan, visiting and talking with U.S. troops and their Afghan partners. My duties with the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force took me into every significant area where our soldiers engage the enemy. Over the course of 12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces.

What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground.

Entering this deployment, I was sincerely hoping to learn that the claims were true: that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that the local government and military were progressing toward self-sufficiency. I did not need to witness dramatic improvements to be reassured, but merely hoped to see evidence of positive trends, to see companies or battalions produce even minimal but sustainable progress.

Instead, I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level.

My arrival in country in late 2010 marked the start of my fourth combat deployment, and my second in Afghanistan. A Regular Army officer in the Armor Branch, I served in Operation Desert Storm, in Afghanistan in 2005-06 and in Iraq in 2008-09. In the middle of my career, I spent eight years in the U.S. Army Reserve and held a number of civilian jobs — among them, legislative correspondent for defense and foreign affairs for Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas.

As a representative for the Rapid Equipping Force, I set out to talk to our troops about their needs and their circumstances. Along the way, I conducted mounted and dismounted combat patrols, spending time with conventional and Special Forces troops. I interviewed or had conversations with more than 250 soldiers in the field, from the lowest-ranking 19-year-old private to division commanders and staff members at every echelon. I spoke at length with Afghan security officials, Afghan civilians and a few village elders.

I saw the incredible difficulties any military force would have to pacify even a single area of any of those provinces; I heard many stories of how insurgents controlled virtually every piece of land beyond eyeshot of a U.S. or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) base.

Yeah, shut up pussy. The links are provided at the source provided. Stop being such a lazy whiny dipshit.

 

[zzzz]

Yeah, shut up pussy. The links are provided at the source provided. Stop being such a lazy whiny dipshit.

No link there.

 

[Decepticon]

Who got us into this mess again?

 

[paulitician]

Yeah, shut up pussy. The links are provided at the source provided. Stop being such a lazy whiny dipshit.

No link there.

Go to the source linked in the OP. If you can't find it, then you're just an imbecile. Either way, stop being such a whiny bitch. Go start your own thread if you're not satisified with this one. Now beat it.