LCS Ships – Why Can't They Get Them Right?

longknife

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Sep 21, 2012
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Seems Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics Bath Works just can't seem to get these new multipurpose vessels right. Initiated in Feb 2002 (Under the Bush administration, of course) the darned things keep breaking down. However, the actual selection and contract operations didn't come until February 2010. The problems are clearly in the power plant.



Installed power: Electrical: 4 Isotta Fraschini V1708 diesel engines, Hitzinger generator units, 800 kW each

Propulsion: 2 Rolls-Royce MT30 36 MW gas turbines, 2 Colt-Pielstick diesel engines, 4 Rolls-Royce waterjets

Speed: 47 knots (87 km/h; 54 mph) (sea state 3)[3]

Range: 3,500 nmi (6,500 km; 4,000 mi) at 18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph)[4]

Endurance: 21 days (336 hours)



The Isotta Fraschini outfit's been around since 1900 with a good record of high performance engines. Rolls-Royce is, of course, a well-established company with power plants that are top of the field. So, what the heck is causing them to break down so often? Maybe this statement in Military Times says more than it means to:



On Aug. 31, Naval Surface Force Commander Vice Adm. Tom Rowden announced the command had completed an engineering stand-down of all LCS squadrons to review procedures and standards, with mandatory re-training for all engineer crews over the next month, and an additional review by the Navy's Surface Warfare Officer's School set to be completed by the end of October.



The crews and not the equipment? What does that indicate?



Full story w/links @ LCS Montgomery Suffers Two Engine Casualties Days After Commissioning | Military.com
 
Let's hope somebody thoroughly proof reads the manuals and all the course material they're using to train those crews.

I once had a vehicle that had a problem that repeated itself. Each time the shop repaired it exactly as ordained by their training and in the manual. Then it would happen again and again they'd fix it according to their training and the same thing would happen again. After six months there was a recall. Of the manual.

Once it was fixed according to revised manual the problem was gone forever.,
 
longknife, et al,

My comment here is just an opener.

I'm not an Naval expert by any means; and I suppose that the entire topic of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) is a unique specialty aspect within the Navy.

BUT, I would like to offer this for consideration.

LCS Montgomery Sustains Hull Crack in Hurricane Surf

A $437 million Crackerjack toy. The power plants keep breaking down and now we learn it can't make it through a rough storm. Who the hell's responsible for wasting out taxpayer money on these things?

The story about this and the others is @ LCS Montgomery Sustains Hull Crack in Hurricane Surf | Military.com
(COMMENT)

The Half-Billion Dollar toy, rush.

Bell/Boeing V-22 Osprey unit cost around $60 Million.
Lockheed Martin All-Weather F/A-22 Raptor has a fly-away cost of about $150 Million.
And the Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Lightning II:
  • F-35A: $98 million
  • F-35B: $104 million
  • F-35C: $116 million
Memory Lane: The Grumman F-14 Tomcat Deployment last ≈ 40 years (1970 - 2010) with an extended life for each to the ≈ 200 Aircraft at about 10,000 hours.

Just like the attempt to control the unit costs on some of the more advanced weapons systems through the means of making them more versatile and multi-role capable. My opinion is that in an effort to keep the LCS Program alive (prevent the program from being cancelled) the Program Advocates are trying to make the LCS all thing to everyone (too many Mission Packages: countermine, antisubmarine, and anti–surface ship operations) on a very weakly defended platform; for cost reduction purposes.

If the Navy actually decides it needs a Littoral mission platform, then it needs to be survivable very fast, tough in taking hits, and exceptionally strong in the volume of fire and destructive nature it can display against targets it is likely to encounter. If the design we have today, cannot meet those thresholds, then we need to dump the current program and restart the initiative. But we shouldn't try to cut corners on the design side (power plant, firepower and weapons systems, speed, maneuverability, and C3I) in an effort to make a second class ship.

Most Respectfully,
R
 
We keep cranking out new ship technology when we haven't had a mission for them in fifty years. The days of the surface Navy are over.
 

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