Justices Reject Campaign Finance Limits

[Intense]

Here is the case that I made reference to in my post, it was referenced in the recent decision and was seen in the Roberts Opinion...

These considerations weigh against retaining our decision in Austin . First, as the majority explains, that decision was an “aberration” insofar as it departed from the robust protections we had granted political speech in our earlier cases. Ante , at 39; see also Buckley , supra ; First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti ,
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON v. BELLOTTI, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)

Freedom of the press is a `fundamental personal right' which `is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. . . . The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.' . . . The informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press . . . is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. Almost any author may quite accurately assert that he is contributing to the flow [435 U.S. 765, 802] of information to the public . . . ." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 -705 (1972), quoting Lovell v. Griffin, supra, at 450, 452
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Just thought this connection would at least explain some sort of reasoning behind this recent decision.

Nice Insight.

The dissent advocates an approach to addressing Citizens United’s claims that I find quite perplexing. It presumably agrees with the majority that Citizens United’s narrower statutory and constitutional arguments lack merit—otherwise its conclusion that the group should lose this case would make no sense. Despite agreeing that these narrower arguments fail, however, the dissent argues that the majority should nonetheless latch on to one of them in order to avoid reaching the broader constitutional question of whether Austin remains good law. It even suggests that the Court’s failure to adopt one of these concededly meritless arguments is a sign that the majority is not “serious about judicial restraint.” Post , at 16.

This approach is based on a false premise: that our practice of avoiding unnecessary (and unnecessarily broad) constitutional holdings somehow trumps our obligation faithfully to interpret the law. It should go without saying, however, that we cannot embrace a narrow ground of decision simply because it is narrow; it must also be right. Thus while it is true that “f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more,” post , at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted), sometimes it is necessary to decide more. There is a difference between judicial restraint and judicial abdication. When constitutional questions are “indispensably necessary” to resolving the case at hand, “the court must meet and decide them.” Ex parte Randolph , 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (No. 11, 558) (CC Va. 1833) (Marshall, C. J.).

CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N