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This is the transcript from the USS Naval Inquiry. All the testimony is public and on the record.
USS LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Available evidence combines to indicate the attack on
LIBERTY on 8 June was in fact a case of mistaken
identity.
2. The calm conditions and slow ship speed may well have
made the American Flag difficult to identify.
3. The ship's westerly heading at the time of attack - in
the general direction of Egyptian ports may have
reinforced elements of doubt in the minds of the several
Israeli pilots who looked the ship over in the forenoon.
4. The colors were shot down early in the action and were
replaced prior to the PT attack.
5. The immediate confusion milling around astern followed
by peaceful
[161]
overtures by the attacking surface forces after launching
only two torpedoes of the six presumed available (two on
each PT boat), indicate these craft may well have identified
the colors for the first time when they got in close enough
to see clearly through the smoke and flames billowing, at
times above the mast head.
6. There are no available indications that the attack was
intended against a U. S. Ship.
7. LIBERTY'S position at the time of the attack has been
previously ordered changed farther to seaward by JCS;
however, the messages relating to these changes were not
known to the ship before the attack took place. The reasons
these messages were not known to the ship can be determined
in all instances except for one. Since LIBERTY records and
knowledgeable personnel were lost in the action, it is
impossible to determine the disposition of the message.
8. The communication delays and mis-routing errors which
caused these several non-deliveries combined with delays in
initiating follow-up actions on operational instructions
received, all contributed to the ship itself being unaware
of plans and decisions made for her repositioning. A
detailed accounting of the five pertinent messages are
attached as appendices one through five.
9. The absence of any identifiable threat to the ship
apparently caused the foregoing referred to operational
actions to be taken and implemented in routine manner, i.e.,
without resorting to highest precedence (Flash) traffic.
10. USS LIBERTY was assigned technical research tasks to be
performed in the eastern Mediterranean by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. LIBERTY first became aware of this new tasking
when she received sailing orders from Abidjan on the Ivory
Coast on the 24th day of May 1967. The precise tasking by
which LIBERTY was ordered to depart Abidjan is significant.
In this tasking language, LIBERTY was directed to proceed to
her new operating area in the eastern Mediterranean via Rota
for pick-up of specifics at "best speed."
[162]
11. LIBERTY received her basic operational and mission
guidance from the JCS through her new operational chain in
JCS 011545Z. LIBERTY proceeded to comply.
12. The Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY conducted the
operations of his ship in accordance with the intent of
directives received by him. The operating area of LIBERTY on
8 June was in accordance with the announce- ments of
intended movement promulgated by the Commanding Officer USS
LIBERTY. Such operating areas were normal to the
accomplishment of LIBERTY's mission. These announcements
were addressed to, and presumably received, by all seniors
in the chain of LIBERTY's operational command. LIBERTY
received no directive, prior to the attack, that higher
authority desired that the ship operate at least 100 miles
from the coastline of the UAR.
13. LIBERTY responded to her newly assigned mission by
departing Abidjan promptly within some four hours from the
time of receipt of her sailing orders. LIBERTY experienced
minor engineering difficulties enroute Rota which caused
her arrival there somewhat later than originally planned.
On departure Rota, LIBERTY filed her movement report and
declared therein her intention to make best speed in
compliance with the JCS detailed tasking assignments set
forth in JCS message dtg 011545Z June 1967. It is
significant to note that in this JCS tasking, two time
frames were identified, one covering the period between 1
June through 8 June, the second covering the period 9 June
to 30 June. During the first period (1 through 8 June),
LIBERTY's movements were prescribed by the JCS to cover her
transit along the north African littoral; and therein were
prescribed minimum closest points of approach allowed to
national maritime boundaries. The terminal point in this 1
through 8 June time frame was to be a navigational position
at latitude 32 North, longitude 33 East. The second time
frame addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assigned
LIBERTY an operating area bounded on the North by latitude
32 North, the north African/Israeli littoral on the south
and between longitudes 33 East and 34 East. It might well
occur to some that LIBERTY's attack occurred on 8 June,
which would have placed her considerably farther to the
North of the African coast, had she conformed explicitly
with the aforementioned JCS directive. However, as LIBERTY
proceeded eastward through the Mediterranean from Rota, she
filed three separate messages
[163]
reports of position and intent which advised superiors of
her plans to anticipate arrival on station - that is, to
arrive somewhat earlier than prescribed by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. Moreover, LIBERTY advised superiors of her
specific intentions to proceed to and operate in the closer
of the two areas to the north African coast - that is south
of latitude 32 north. Finally in this regard, LIBERTY
reported her arrival at her final destination to appropriate
addressees.
14. It is understood from representatives of the JCS Fact
Finding Group that it was receipt of LIBERTY's 7 June
SITREP/POSIT report which stated her final destination which
prompted concern in the JRC as to her proximity to the
African coast on the night of June 7th. This concern by
responsible authorities, who initially has tasked LIBERTY,
resulted in follow-on actions and directives to the ship
which were either never received or were transmitted on the
fleet broadcast from NAVCOMMSTA Asmara after the attack has
taken place.
15. Pertinent to the findings of fact is the matter of
communication conditions regarding USS LIBERTY during the
period of 1 and 8 June. The ship is known not to have
received at least five messages sent prior to the attack,
each of which was not only important but, in that respect,
critical to the events which terminated in the aggravated
attack on this ship on June the 8th.
16. Higher authority modified LIBERTY's original
operational guidance between June first and the attack on
the eighth, which, if she had received it, would have
resulted in her being further off shore.
17. Combination and compounding of many delayed
communication deliveries related to LIBERTY incident denied
the ship the benefit of command decisions actually made
prior to the attack which, among other things, would have
caused the ship, as a minimum, to be heading further
off-shore from her 081200Z actual position.
18. Pre-attack overflights of LIBERTY: (First air attack
occurred at 1403 local) Unidentified aircraft circled
LIBERTY at:
[164]
0850 ( 5 hours 13 minutes prior to attack) (080742Z refers)
1056 ( 3 hours 7 minutes prior to attack) 1126 ( 2 hours 37
minutes prior to attack) 081022Z refers
Hull markings were clean and freshly painted - ensign was
flying from foremast halyard.
19. Aircraft attack on LIBERTY Attack initiated by single
aircraft, making a run similar to previous overflights.
First warning that this aircraft had attacked ship was a
rocket explosion abaft the bridge, port side. In five of
six attacks, from various angles, two or more jet aircraft
at a time conducted strafing, rocket and incendiary attacks.
20. Motor Torpedo Boat attack on LIBERTY. Twenty minutes
following air attack, MTB's closed ship to a position 2000
yards on starboard quarter and signaled ship by flashing
light. At this time ship had been making turns for FLANK
speed for 9 minutes (Estima- ted SOA 15-17 knots). Holiday
ensign was flying from the starboard yardarm for at least
five minutes before torpedo attack was launched. LIBERTY 50
cal. guns opened fire while the MTS was signaling. The
torpedo attack was launched shortly after the MTBs were
fired upon, and MTB's strafed the ship with machine gun fire
as, at least, one MTB passed down the starboard side.
24. Offers of assistance. Post air attack signaling by MTB's
(before torpedo attack), may have been an offer of
assistance.
Thirty minutes after attacking LIBERTY the MTBs signaled in
English, "Do you need help?"
Two hours and 10 minutes after torpedo attack (2 hours 40
minutes after air attack) an Israeli helo apparently offered
assistance.
Israeli defense forces reported they conducted air and
surface searches for survivors at the scene of the attack
responding to a U. S. request.
22. Groups of up to two and three jet and propeller
aircraft begin coming
[165]
out from shore and circling ship at altitudes ranging from
500 up to several thousand feet at about eight hundred local
on day of attack. Planes in question were otherwise active
over El Arish on Sinai north coast which was plainly visible
from the ship some sixteen miles off shore.
Ship's navigation was sound and practical, using bearings on
minaret in El Arish and radar range to beach at that point.
23. The ship had exercises at full G. Q. and secured only a
short time prior to the unprovoked attack. After securing
from G. Q., the Commanding Officer had admonished all hands
over the PA system that large billowing clouds of black
smoke ashore were evidence of intense military activity,
therefore, crew should be "heads up ball players" as long as
she was in that close.
24. From the time of first air attack onward, attackers
were well coord- inated, accurate and determined.
Criss-crossing rocket and machine gun runs from both bows,
both beams, and quarters effectively chewed up entire
topside including ship control and internal communications
(sound powered) network. Well directed initial air attacks
had wiped out the ability of the four 50 cal. machine guns
to be effective.
25. PT attack first developed from starboard side and was
identified as a high speed run in. Center and lead PT began
flashing signal light and very shortly thereafter the
Commanding Officer identified the Star of David flag on this
lead boat. LIBERTY's signal light had been shot away
requiring dependence upon an Aldis lamp to try and penetrate
the smoke on the bearing of the PTs.
26. The Commanding Officer had passed word to stand by for
torpedo attack and the forward starboard 50 cal. fired a
very short burst in the direction of the boats on the
gunner's own initiative. Having seen Israeli flag on the
PT, the Commanding Officer waved to the forward gunner to
cease firing. The after starboard gun, opened up at this
point, with apparently no one pulling the trigger. The
bridge could not see this gun for smoke and flame on the
starboard side, so the Commanding Officer sent a runner to
tell him cease fire. Before this runner could reach the
after starboard
[166]
gun, effective high volume fire from this gun was peppering
the water around the middle PT. It appears as though 50
Cal. ammunition was cooking off from intense fire. The gun
was seen to be firing with no one manning it.
27. The reaction of all three PTs immediately after launch,
when they stopped and milled around close aboard LIBERTY and
then offered help by signal light, combine to indicate this
was the first time the U. S. large colors flying were
actually positively identified. Not having signal lights
available, the Commanding Officer then made the
international flaghoist meaning, "Not Under Command."
28. Flat, calm conditions and the slow five knot patrol
speed of LIBERTY in forenoon when she was being looked over
initially may well have produced insufficient wind for
steaming colors enough to be seen by pilots.
29. USS LIBERTY had installed communications equipment
whose reliability and degree of sophistication produced a
feeling of maximum confidence in operators, the
Communications Officer, and the Commanding Officer
regarding the reliability of reception on fleet broadcast
which minimized the number of missed numbers.
30. In amplification of the proceeding statement, the
superior communi- cation capability inherent in LIBERTY's
embarked element for technical research purposes combined
with interests of economy in personnel have dictated that
during LIBERTY's operation in her present configuration she
used the best embarked equipments and personnel available to
serve both her technical research requirements as well as
operational and administrative requirements for the ship
itself. The resulting consolidation of functions found
LIBERTY organized internally in a way such that, in the
person of a single officer we find both LIBERTY's
Communication Officer and the Assistant Director of
Technical Research. This system had well. After the attack,
those LIBERTY personnel left alive who had been serving in
combined capacities of this sort reported their conviction
that such practices should continue.
[167]
31. The aforementioned facts relative to communication
procedural peculiarities unique to ships of LIBERTY's
mission resulted in the ship transmitting under the
scheduling control of the research department. This practice
permitted optimum performance by the research department,
scheduling outgoing transmissions during lull periods of
research activities; furthermore, when available research
lull periods were short, the practice had grown up, quite
naturally, to combine into single transmission packages all
of the outgoing traffic which had accumulated. Such
procedures necessitated transmission of each ships
communication package under a classification applicable to
the highest classification of any single element within the
package itself. Such transmission packages would frequently
contain research material, ship position reports, and,
periodically, requests for messages missed on the regular
ship broadcast schedule. A built-in delay factor exists in
this procedure however, inasmuch as not all shore-based
terminals are equipped to accommodate research material. In
the case of LIBERTY during the time period under
consideration, the closest available eligible terminal for
LIBERTY research material was NAVSECGRUDET Morocco, rather
than NAVCOMMSTA Asmara, which happened to be serving LIBERTY
as a subscriber at the time of the attack. The above
conditions are detailed to point up occurrence of delays
which must be anticipated in any such system. In summary,
if LIBERTY had a normal outgoing message requesting missing
sked numbers, it would first have to wait, under normal
circumstances, for transmission during a lull period. It
would next, by virtue of leaving the ship as part of a
package containing research data, go to NAVSECGRU- DET
Morocco where the combined communication package would be
broken down in its component parts; thirdly, the element of
the package requesting retransmission of missed fleet
broadcast numbers would then have to be sent from NAVCOMMSTA
Morocco back to NAVCOMMSTA Asmara for action, Asmara being
the transmitting station serving LIBERTY at the time.
[168]
32. Detailed questioning of available surviving
communication witnesses disclosed that LIBERTY had never
before found missing messages, subsequently requested and
received, to have been critical to ship's operational
commitments.
This fact was explained by ship's personnel as being due to
the very few messages ever missed. This condition was
attributed to superior equipment in the ship coupled with
the fact that the ship operated independently as a regular
practice and had not found herself wanting at any time
previous.
33. It is important to be aware at this point that there
are no logs and or records available in LIBERTY. There are
no communication officers left alive with first hand
knowledge of the missed message backlog on 8 June. It could
only be determined from testimony that the ship had been
copying transmissions from NAVCOMSTA Asmara with no apparent
difficulty from 70000lZ and the time of the attack. One
witness who was on watch on the Asmara broadcast between the
hours of 0645 and 1615 on 7 June stated that he had logged
no missed message numbers during the period of his watch and
that the reception of the JRAIT broadcast was excellent.
34. LIBERTY's technical mission was one that made it
necessary, in exercising the aforementioned close
cooperation, to use minimum electronic transmissions and
radiations on certain frequencies - radio transmissions
particularly. LIBERTY was continually subjected to and used
to the prejudicial effects such transmissions would on the
degree of efficiency of her primary functions. In summary
on this point, ships of LIBERTY's configuration, like
submarines, are members a "silent service" all their own.
35. It is found that it has been, and continues standard
practice, in ships of this type to cultivate great patience
with regards to desires to get electrical traffic off the
ship because of the prejudicial effect on the ship's
mission.
36. It is evident that communications procedures for ships
of this type would be improved were they to be considered in
a communication category analogous to submarines.
[169]
37. On the matter of operational control of LIBERTY vis a
vis the precise directives to the ship governing the
application of her embarked capabilities, it is important to
understand LIBERTY's situation as a mobile platform, under
naval command, transporting capabilities belonging to a
service or agency other than the Navy. This condition and
situation, while not unique to naval platforms, requires a
complete awareness and understanding of the very close
coordination and cooperation between those responsible for
operation of and positioning of the platform itself in
relation to those responsible for the embarked capabilities.
Detailed testimony discloses that LIBERTY found absolutely
no difficulties accommodating to this conditions, unique
within the navy to ships off this particular type.
38. The on-line crypto capability has engendered a
dangerous willingness to send more classified traffic than
in days of manual decoding without required proportionate
increase in experienced supervisory personnel to ride herd
on traffic quantum increases. Conversely, we find often
very inexperienced personnel being the first to give
attention to misrouted messages such as those in question.
39. Key messages critical to international relations were
not in this case, paralleled on other circuits.
40. High precedence of operational messages is too often
not enough to overcome circuit choking resulting from large
volume of such as FBIS of the same precedence competing for
inexperienced operator attention at the same time.
41. LIBERTY's embarked "warning" capabilities apparently
gave no indication of impending danger during the period
prior to the attack.
42. LIBERTY had experienced periodic reconnaissance on this
and other operating stations which tended to create a
feeling of "acceptance without undue concern" conditions as
they were on 8 June 1967.
Reconnaissance experiences known to LIBERTY and other ships
of LIBERTY's class in other parts of the world minimized
concern by LIBERTY personnel
[170]
over recon efforts on 8 June.
43. Commanding Officer LIBERTY appropriately reported
recon early on A.M. of 8 June through her "locating two".
This report was transmitted promptly by ship despite
temporary interruption of her mission, at the direction of
the Commanding Officer.
44. Up to the time of the attack, testimony disclosed no
reasons to abort LIBERTY's mission in accordance with
paragraph 1A of Appendix B to SM 676-66 of 19 August 1966.
45. The degrees of coordination and accuracy of the air and
surface attacks combined first to wipe out defense and
shipboard control capabilities, followed by the crippling
blow of a torpedo.
46. The Israeli aircraft rockets penetrated topside steel
easily, leaving roughly five inch holes, with innumerable
shrapnel pock marks on the inside of spaces penetrated.
47. The heroism displayed by the Commanding Officer,
officers and men of the LIBERTY was exceptional. The
Commanding Officer is being recommended for the
Congressional Medal, and the ship for an appropriate unit
citation. These planned actions are fully supported by
testimony to the Court.
48. LIBERTY apparently experienced a phenomenon identified
as electronic jamming of her voice radio just prior to and
during air attacks. This jamming was described as a steady
carrier without modulation.
49. Disparities in reported times relating to sequence of
events can well be attributed to the number of ship's clocks
on board hanging askew and often stopped from shock at
various times. It was necessary to reconstruct time
sequences, because QM notebook was incomplete from 1355 to
1446 since the QM was killed during the first attack.
50. Extent of Damage. The major material damage to LIBERTY
resulted from the torpedo explosion, as follows:
A. SHELL DAMAGE: Hole centered at FR 60 and extending 24
ft downward from just below second deck and longitudinally
from frame 53
[171]
to frame 66 (39 feet). The hole was teardrop in shape,
larger at bottom.
B. Interior structural damage: Outboard 15 feet of first
platform and associated structure badly damaged. Lesser
damage to second platform deck (tank top). Second deck and
frames buckled from frame 52 to frame 62 and extending
inboard 15 feet.
C. Major damage to all interior joiner bulkheads below
second deck frame 52 to 78, entire width of ship.
In summary of above, the two research compartments, which
extend the entire width of the ship, suffered severe
structural damage and were flooded. Installed equipment and
fittings were reduced to twisted wreckage.
Topside damage resulting from aircraft strafing and rocked
attacks and from MTB strafing (ship was hit by more than
821 shells and rockets, many of them incendiary) summarized
as follows:
Pilot house and signal bridge forward deck house, all gun
tubs, many antennas including radar antenna, numerous
bulkheads and decks holed by explosive rockets. Whale boat
destroyed in davits by incendiary rockets and many life
rafts holed or burned in their stowages. Flag bags burned
and numerous fires resulting from incendiary munitions.
The gyro compass, air conditioning plant and many minor
items of equipment, located in superstructure spaces, were
damaged or destroyed. Numerous living spaces and personnel
effects damaged by holing, shrapnel and wetting during
firefighting.
Cost estimated - Value of destroyed research equipment $6-8
million, 12 months lead time. Structural repairs to ship
and ship's equipment $2-4 million, 3-4 months.
51. The Israeli government set forth 7 points of rationale
to explain their position relative to the attack on LIBERTY
in USDAO Tel Aviv message DTG 091520Z. Legal opinion and
other comments on each is appended hereto (Appendix VI).
[172]
52. That any killed or wounded personnel attached to the
USS LIBERTY during the attack are eligible for the Purple
Heart under the provisions of SECNAVINST. P1650.1C Chapter
TWO SECTION THREE ARTICLE 231 PARA 12 b. sub-paras (4) and
(5). The Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY is preparing a
listing of eligible personnel to be recommended.
[173]
[signature] Isaac C. KIDD, Jr.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President
[signature] Bernard J. LAUFF
Captain, U.S. Navy Member
[signature] Bert N. ATKINSON,
Jr. Captain, U.S. Navy Member
[signature] Isaac C. KIDD, Jr. Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President
[signature] Ward BOSTON, Jr. Captain, U.S. Navy Counsel for
the Court
[174]
USS LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Available evidence combines to indicate the attack on
LIBERTY on 8 June was in fact a case of mistaken
identity.
2. The calm conditions and slow ship speed may well have
made the American Flag difficult to identify.
3. The ship's westerly heading at the time of attack - in
the general direction of Egyptian ports may have
reinforced elements of doubt in the minds of the several
Israeli pilots who looked the ship over in the forenoon.
4. The colors were shot down early in the action and were
replaced prior to the PT attack.
5. The immediate confusion milling around astern followed
by peaceful
[161]
overtures by the attacking surface forces after launching
only two torpedoes of the six presumed available (two on
each PT boat), indicate these craft may well have identified
the colors for the first time when they got in close enough
to see clearly through the smoke and flames billowing, at
times above the mast head.
6. There are no available indications that the attack was
intended against a U. S. Ship.
7. LIBERTY'S position at the time of the attack has been
previously ordered changed farther to seaward by JCS;
however, the messages relating to these changes were not
known to the ship before the attack took place. The reasons
these messages were not known to the ship can be determined
in all instances except for one. Since LIBERTY records and
knowledgeable personnel were lost in the action, it is
impossible to determine the disposition of the message.
8. The communication delays and mis-routing errors which
caused these several non-deliveries combined with delays in
initiating follow-up actions on operational instructions
received, all contributed to the ship itself being unaware
of plans and decisions made for her repositioning. A
detailed accounting of the five pertinent messages are
attached as appendices one through five.
9. The absence of any identifiable threat to the ship
apparently caused the foregoing referred to operational
actions to be taken and implemented in routine manner, i.e.,
without resorting to highest precedence (Flash) traffic.
10. USS LIBERTY was assigned technical research tasks to be
performed in the eastern Mediterranean by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. LIBERTY first became aware of this new tasking
when she received sailing orders from Abidjan on the Ivory
Coast on the 24th day of May 1967. The precise tasking by
which LIBERTY was ordered to depart Abidjan is significant.
In this tasking language, LIBERTY was directed to proceed to
her new operating area in the eastern Mediterranean via Rota
for pick-up of specifics at "best speed."
[162]
11. LIBERTY received her basic operational and mission
guidance from the JCS through her new operational chain in
JCS 011545Z. LIBERTY proceeded to comply.
12. The Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY conducted the
operations of his ship in accordance with the intent of
directives received by him. The operating area of LIBERTY on
8 June was in accordance with the announce- ments of
intended movement promulgated by the Commanding Officer USS
LIBERTY. Such operating areas were normal to the
accomplishment of LIBERTY's mission. These announcements
were addressed to, and presumably received, by all seniors
in the chain of LIBERTY's operational command. LIBERTY
received no directive, prior to the attack, that higher
authority desired that the ship operate at least 100 miles
from the coastline of the UAR.
13. LIBERTY responded to her newly assigned mission by
departing Abidjan promptly within some four hours from the
time of receipt of her sailing orders. LIBERTY experienced
minor engineering difficulties enroute Rota which caused
her arrival there somewhat later than originally planned.
On departure Rota, LIBERTY filed her movement report and
declared therein her intention to make best speed in
compliance with the JCS detailed tasking assignments set
forth in JCS message dtg 011545Z June 1967. It is
significant to note that in this JCS tasking, two time
frames were identified, one covering the period between 1
June through 8 June, the second covering the period 9 June
to 30 June. During the first period (1 through 8 June),
LIBERTY's movements were prescribed by the JCS to cover her
transit along the north African littoral; and therein were
prescribed minimum closest points of approach allowed to
national maritime boundaries. The terminal point in this 1
through 8 June time frame was to be a navigational position
at latitude 32 North, longitude 33 East. The second time
frame addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assigned
LIBERTY an operating area bounded on the North by latitude
32 North, the north African/Israeli littoral on the south
and between longitudes 33 East and 34 East. It might well
occur to some that LIBERTY's attack occurred on 8 June,
which would have placed her considerably farther to the
North of the African coast, had she conformed explicitly
with the aforementioned JCS directive. However, as LIBERTY
proceeded eastward through the Mediterranean from Rota, she
filed three separate messages
[163]
reports of position and intent which advised superiors of
her plans to anticipate arrival on station - that is, to
arrive somewhat earlier than prescribed by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. Moreover, LIBERTY advised superiors of her
specific intentions to proceed to and operate in the closer
of the two areas to the north African coast - that is south
of latitude 32 north. Finally in this regard, LIBERTY
reported her arrival at her final destination to appropriate
addressees.
14. It is understood from representatives of the JCS Fact
Finding Group that it was receipt of LIBERTY's 7 June
SITREP/POSIT report which stated her final destination which
prompted concern in the JRC as to her proximity to the
African coast on the night of June 7th. This concern by
responsible authorities, who initially has tasked LIBERTY,
resulted in follow-on actions and directives to the ship
which were either never received or were transmitted on the
fleet broadcast from NAVCOMMSTA Asmara after the attack has
taken place.
15. Pertinent to the findings of fact is the matter of
communication conditions regarding USS LIBERTY during the
period of 1 and 8 June. The ship is known not to have
received at least five messages sent prior to the attack,
each of which was not only important but, in that respect,
critical to the events which terminated in the aggravated
attack on this ship on June the 8th.
16. Higher authority modified LIBERTY's original
operational guidance between June first and the attack on
the eighth, which, if she had received it, would have
resulted in her being further off shore.
17. Combination and compounding of many delayed
communication deliveries related to LIBERTY incident denied
the ship the benefit of command decisions actually made
prior to the attack which, among other things, would have
caused the ship, as a minimum, to be heading further
off-shore from her 081200Z actual position.
18. Pre-attack overflights of LIBERTY: (First air attack
occurred at 1403 local) Unidentified aircraft circled
LIBERTY at:
[164]
0850 ( 5 hours 13 minutes prior to attack) (080742Z refers)
1056 ( 3 hours 7 minutes prior to attack) 1126 ( 2 hours 37
minutes prior to attack) 081022Z refers
Hull markings were clean and freshly painted - ensign was
flying from foremast halyard.
19. Aircraft attack on LIBERTY Attack initiated by single
aircraft, making a run similar to previous overflights.
First warning that this aircraft had attacked ship was a
rocket explosion abaft the bridge, port side. In five of
six attacks, from various angles, two or more jet aircraft
at a time conducted strafing, rocket and incendiary attacks.
20. Motor Torpedo Boat attack on LIBERTY. Twenty minutes
following air attack, MTB's closed ship to a position 2000
yards on starboard quarter and signaled ship by flashing
light. At this time ship had been making turns for FLANK
speed for 9 minutes (Estima- ted SOA 15-17 knots). Holiday
ensign was flying from the starboard yardarm for at least
five minutes before torpedo attack was launched. LIBERTY 50
cal. guns opened fire while the MTS was signaling. The
torpedo attack was launched shortly after the MTBs were
fired upon, and MTB's strafed the ship with machine gun fire
as, at least, one MTB passed down the starboard side.
24. Offers of assistance. Post air attack signaling by MTB's
(before torpedo attack), may have been an offer of
assistance.
Thirty minutes after attacking LIBERTY the MTBs signaled in
English, "Do you need help?"
Two hours and 10 minutes after torpedo attack (2 hours 40
minutes after air attack) an Israeli helo apparently offered
assistance.
Israeli defense forces reported they conducted air and
surface searches for survivors at the scene of the attack
responding to a U. S. request.
22. Groups of up to two and three jet and propeller
aircraft begin coming
[165]
out from shore and circling ship at altitudes ranging from
500 up to several thousand feet at about eight hundred local
on day of attack. Planes in question were otherwise active
over El Arish on Sinai north coast which was plainly visible
from the ship some sixteen miles off shore.
Ship's navigation was sound and practical, using bearings on
minaret in El Arish and radar range to beach at that point.
23. The ship had exercises at full G. Q. and secured only a
short time prior to the unprovoked attack. After securing
from G. Q., the Commanding Officer had admonished all hands
over the PA system that large billowing clouds of black
smoke ashore were evidence of intense military activity,
therefore, crew should be "heads up ball players" as long as
she was in that close.
24. From the time of first air attack onward, attackers
were well coord- inated, accurate and determined.
Criss-crossing rocket and machine gun runs from both bows,
both beams, and quarters effectively chewed up entire
topside including ship control and internal communications
(sound powered) network. Well directed initial air attacks
had wiped out the ability of the four 50 cal. machine guns
to be effective.
25. PT attack first developed from starboard side and was
identified as a high speed run in. Center and lead PT began
flashing signal light and very shortly thereafter the
Commanding Officer identified the Star of David flag on this
lead boat. LIBERTY's signal light had been shot away
requiring dependence upon an Aldis lamp to try and penetrate
the smoke on the bearing of the PTs.
26. The Commanding Officer had passed word to stand by for
torpedo attack and the forward starboard 50 cal. fired a
very short burst in the direction of the boats on the
gunner's own initiative. Having seen Israeli flag on the
PT, the Commanding Officer waved to the forward gunner to
cease firing. The after starboard gun, opened up at this
point, with apparently no one pulling the trigger. The
bridge could not see this gun for smoke and flame on the
starboard side, so the Commanding Officer sent a runner to
tell him cease fire. Before this runner could reach the
after starboard
[166]
gun, effective high volume fire from this gun was peppering
the water around the middle PT. It appears as though 50
Cal. ammunition was cooking off from intense fire. The gun
was seen to be firing with no one manning it.
27. The reaction of all three PTs immediately after launch,
when they stopped and milled around close aboard LIBERTY and
then offered help by signal light, combine to indicate this
was the first time the U. S. large colors flying were
actually positively identified. Not having signal lights
available, the Commanding Officer then made the
international flaghoist meaning, "Not Under Command."
28. Flat, calm conditions and the slow five knot patrol
speed of LIBERTY in forenoon when she was being looked over
initially may well have produced insufficient wind for
steaming colors enough to be seen by pilots.
29. USS LIBERTY had installed communications equipment
whose reliability and degree of sophistication produced a
feeling of maximum confidence in operators, the
Communications Officer, and the Commanding Officer
regarding the reliability of reception on fleet broadcast
which minimized the number of missed numbers.
30. In amplification of the proceeding statement, the
superior communi- cation capability inherent in LIBERTY's
embarked element for technical research purposes combined
with interests of economy in personnel have dictated that
during LIBERTY's operation in her present configuration she
used the best embarked equipments and personnel available to
serve both her technical research requirements as well as
operational and administrative requirements for the ship
itself. The resulting consolidation of functions found
LIBERTY organized internally in a way such that, in the
person of a single officer we find both LIBERTY's
Communication Officer and the Assistant Director of
Technical Research. This system had well. After the attack,
those LIBERTY personnel left alive who had been serving in
combined capacities of this sort reported their conviction
that such practices should continue.
[167]
31. The aforementioned facts relative to communication
procedural peculiarities unique to ships of LIBERTY's
mission resulted in the ship transmitting under the
scheduling control of the research department. This practice
permitted optimum performance by the research department,
scheduling outgoing transmissions during lull periods of
research activities; furthermore, when available research
lull periods were short, the practice had grown up, quite
naturally, to combine into single transmission packages all
of the outgoing traffic which had accumulated. Such
procedures necessitated transmission of each ships
communication package under a classification applicable to
the highest classification of any single element within the
package itself. Such transmission packages would frequently
contain research material, ship position reports, and,
periodically, requests for messages missed on the regular
ship broadcast schedule. A built-in delay factor exists in
this procedure however, inasmuch as not all shore-based
terminals are equipped to accommodate research material. In
the case of LIBERTY during the time period under
consideration, the closest available eligible terminal for
LIBERTY research material was NAVSECGRUDET Morocco, rather
than NAVCOMMSTA Asmara, which happened to be serving LIBERTY
as a subscriber at the time of the attack. The above
conditions are detailed to point up occurrence of delays
which must be anticipated in any such system. In summary,
if LIBERTY had a normal outgoing message requesting missing
sked numbers, it would first have to wait, under normal
circumstances, for transmission during a lull period. It
would next, by virtue of leaving the ship as part of a
package containing research data, go to NAVSECGRU- DET
Morocco where the combined communication package would be
broken down in its component parts; thirdly, the element of
the package requesting retransmission of missed fleet
broadcast numbers would then have to be sent from NAVCOMMSTA
Morocco back to NAVCOMMSTA Asmara for action, Asmara being
the transmitting station serving LIBERTY at the time.
[168]
32. Detailed questioning of available surviving
communication witnesses disclosed that LIBERTY had never
before found missing messages, subsequently requested and
received, to have been critical to ship's operational
commitments.
This fact was explained by ship's personnel as being due to
the very few messages ever missed. This condition was
attributed to superior equipment in the ship coupled with
the fact that the ship operated independently as a regular
practice and had not found herself wanting at any time
previous.
33. It is important to be aware at this point that there
are no logs and or records available in LIBERTY. There are
no communication officers left alive with first hand
knowledge of the missed message backlog on 8 June. It could
only be determined from testimony that the ship had been
copying transmissions from NAVCOMSTA Asmara with no apparent
difficulty from 70000lZ and the time of the attack. One
witness who was on watch on the Asmara broadcast between the
hours of 0645 and 1615 on 7 June stated that he had logged
no missed message numbers during the period of his watch and
that the reception of the JRAIT broadcast was excellent.
34. LIBERTY's technical mission was one that made it
necessary, in exercising the aforementioned close
cooperation, to use minimum electronic transmissions and
radiations on certain frequencies - radio transmissions
particularly. LIBERTY was continually subjected to and used
to the prejudicial effects such transmissions would on the
degree of efficiency of her primary functions. In summary
on this point, ships of LIBERTY's configuration, like
submarines, are members a "silent service" all their own.
35. It is found that it has been, and continues standard
practice, in ships of this type to cultivate great patience
with regards to desires to get electrical traffic off the
ship because of the prejudicial effect on the ship's
mission.
36. It is evident that communications procedures for ships
of this type would be improved were they to be considered in
a communication category analogous to submarines.
[169]
37. On the matter of operational control of LIBERTY vis a
vis the precise directives to the ship governing the
application of her embarked capabilities, it is important to
understand LIBERTY's situation as a mobile platform, under
naval command, transporting capabilities belonging to a
service or agency other than the Navy. This condition and
situation, while not unique to naval platforms, requires a
complete awareness and understanding of the very close
coordination and cooperation between those responsible for
operation of and positioning of the platform itself in
relation to those responsible for the embarked capabilities.
Detailed testimony discloses that LIBERTY found absolutely
no difficulties accommodating to this conditions, unique
within the navy to ships off this particular type.
38. The on-line crypto capability has engendered a
dangerous willingness to send more classified traffic than
in days of manual decoding without required proportionate
increase in experienced supervisory personnel to ride herd
on traffic quantum increases. Conversely, we find often
very inexperienced personnel being the first to give
attention to misrouted messages such as those in question.
39. Key messages critical to international relations were
not in this case, paralleled on other circuits.
40. High precedence of operational messages is too often
not enough to overcome circuit choking resulting from large
volume of such as FBIS of the same precedence competing for
inexperienced operator attention at the same time.
41. LIBERTY's embarked "warning" capabilities apparently
gave no indication of impending danger during the period
prior to the attack.
42. LIBERTY had experienced periodic reconnaissance on this
and other operating stations which tended to create a
feeling of "acceptance without undue concern" conditions as
they were on 8 June 1967.
Reconnaissance experiences known to LIBERTY and other ships
of LIBERTY's class in other parts of the world minimized
concern by LIBERTY personnel
[170]
over recon efforts on 8 June.
43. Commanding Officer LIBERTY appropriately reported
recon early on A.M. of 8 June through her "locating two".
This report was transmitted promptly by ship despite
temporary interruption of her mission, at the direction of
the Commanding Officer.
44. Up to the time of the attack, testimony disclosed no
reasons to abort LIBERTY's mission in accordance with
paragraph 1A of Appendix B to SM 676-66 of 19 August 1966.
45. The degrees of coordination and accuracy of the air and
surface attacks combined first to wipe out defense and
shipboard control capabilities, followed by the crippling
blow of a torpedo.
46. The Israeli aircraft rockets penetrated topside steel
easily, leaving roughly five inch holes, with innumerable
shrapnel pock marks on the inside of spaces penetrated.
47. The heroism displayed by the Commanding Officer,
officers and men of the LIBERTY was exceptional. The
Commanding Officer is being recommended for the
Congressional Medal, and the ship for an appropriate unit
citation. These planned actions are fully supported by
testimony to the Court.
48. LIBERTY apparently experienced a phenomenon identified
as electronic jamming of her voice radio just prior to and
during air attacks. This jamming was described as a steady
carrier without modulation.
49. Disparities in reported times relating to sequence of
events can well be attributed to the number of ship's clocks
on board hanging askew and often stopped from shock at
various times. It was necessary to reconstruct time
sequences, because QM notebook was incomplete from 1355 to
1446 since the QM was killed during the first attack.
50. Extent of Damage. The major material damage to LIBERTY
resulted from the torpedo explosion, as follows:
A. SHELL DAMAGE: Hole centered at FR 60 and extending 24
ft downward from just below second deck and longitudinally
from frame 53
[171]
to frame 66 (39 feet). The hole was teardrop in shape,
larger at bottom.
B. Interior structural damage: Outboard 15 feet of first
platform and associated structure badly damaged. Lesser
damage to second platform deck (tank top). Second deck and
frames buckled from frame 52 to frame 62 and extending
inboard 15 feet.
C. Major damage to all interior joiner bulkheads below
second deck frame 52 to 78, entire width of ship.
In summary of above, the two research compartments, which
extend the entire width of the ship, suffered severe
structural damage and were flooded. Installed equipment and
fittings were reduced to twisted wreckage.
Topside damage resulting from aircraft strafing and rocked
attacks and from MTB strafing (ship was hit by more than
821 shells and rockets, many of them incendiary) summarized
as follows:
Pilot house and signal bridge forward deck house, all gun
tubs, many antennas including radar antenna, numerous
bulkheads and decks holed by explosive rockets. Whale boat
destroyed in davits by incendiary rockets and many life
rafts holed or burned in their stowages. Flag bags burned
and numerous fires resulting from incendiary munitions.
The gyro compass, air conditioning plant and many minor
items of equipment, located in superstructure spaces, were
damaged or destroyed. Numerous living spaces and personnel
effects damaged by holing, shrapnel and wetting during
firefighting.
Cost estimated - Value of destroyed research equipment $6-8
million, 12 months lead time. Structural repairs to ship
and ship's equipment $2-4 million, 3-4 months.
51. The Israeli government set forth 7 points of rationale
to explain their position relative to the attack on LIBERTY
in USDAO Tel Aviv message DTG 091520Z. Legal opinion and
other comments on each is appended hereto (Appendix VI).
[172]
52. That any killed or wounded personnel attached to the
USS LIBERTY during the attack are eligible for the Purple
Heart under the provisions of SECNAVINST. P1650.1C Chapter
TWO SECTION THREE ARTICLE 231 PARA 12 b. sub-paras (4) and
(5). The Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY is preparing a
listing of eligible personnel to be recommended.
[173]
[signature] Isaac C. KIDD, Jr.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President
[signature] Bernard J. LAUFF
Captain, U.S. Navy Member
[signature] Bert N. ATKINSON,
Jr. Captain, U.S. Navy Member
[signature] Isaac C. KIDD, Jr. Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President
[signature] Ward BOSTON, Jr. Captain, U.S. Navy Counsel for
the Court
[174]
~BH
Good one.
