Doolittle's raid April 1942

In war typically there are many blunders and successes by both sides.

At the end of the day the only thing that matter is who won and who lost. For instance, in the US Revolution we lost 90% of the battles we fought but managed to militarily defeat the British.

The Japs were destined to lose whenever they made the decision to attack the US.

In defeating them we were sometimes lucky and at other times very efficient. Sometimes we made blunders. I wouldn't call the Dolittle raid a blunder.

The Japs should be glad that it was us that defeated them. We didn't plunder them like others would have and we helped them to build one of the strongest economies in the world.
 
Was it worth all the trouble and planning and jeopardizing Halsey's fleet so early in the war? The raid was immortalized in the book "30 Seconds Over Tokyo" and later the movie by the same name. There was never any serious criticism of the raid and Doolittle and the surviving crew were treated like heroes. Halsey was probably a reluctant participant, When a Japanese picket boat was spotted and sunk by gunfire Halsey ordered the bombers to take off before the planned time and they were effectively doomed even if they could reach China. The raid killed about 50 Japanese and did little strategic damage. The official report raved about the effect the raid had on Japanese morale but that may have been an overstatement. It's likely that the raid caused the Japanese to tighten their defenses and pissed them off.
Other than some "hit and run" raids on Japan's furthest outposts, there was little opportunity for the US Navy/carriers to have any significant engagement with Japan's Navy (which was largely involved further West in Asia and Eastern Pacific supporting operations there), in those first few months. Also, wiser minds advised some caution since our carrier forces had limited experience in combat and could use some more operational training; i.e. let's not rush in and risk what precious little we have too soon.

There was some serious criticisms at time of inception and planning, and even afterward. But results showed the raid to be a beneficial "expense". Note that in the first months after December advances by Japan, USA Chief of Staff General George Marshall was advocating for a landing by the US Army, ASAP, on the shores of German occupied France. With very little Army forces/divisions, and those barely trained and equip, one has to wonder what he was thinking in rational terms versus emotional ones. Fortunately Churchill and the UK General Staff was able to convince the USA to engage caution and some larger build up before attempting what would have been a sure failure in 1942 (or even 1943 as we learned once landed in North Africa in November of 1942).

Interestingly, the experience of launching twin engined aircraft off of a carrier resulted in more serious consideration of such types for carrier airgroups. Resulting in the Grumman F7F Tigercat;
and just post war Savage;
 
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Was it worth all the trouble and planning and jeopardizing Halsey's fleet so early in the war? The raid was immortalized in the book "30 Seconds Over Tokyo" and later the movie by the same name. There was never any serious criticism of the raid and Doolittle and the surviving crew were treated like heroes. Halsey was probably a reluctant participant, When a Japanese picket boat was spotted and sunk by gunfire Halsey ordered the bombers to take off before the planned time and they were effectively doomed even if they could reach China. The raid killed about 50 Japanese and did little strategic damage. The official report raved about the effect the raid had on Japanese morale but that may have been an overstatement. It's likely that the raid caused the Japanese to tighten their defenses and pissed them off.
For further context and information, especially to those whom don't seem very knowledgeable, select excerpts;
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...It was the first American air operation to strike the Japanese archipelago. Although the raid caused comparatively minor damage, it demonstrated that the Japanese mainland was vulnerable to American air attacks. It served as an initial retaliation for the 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, and provided an important boost to American morale. The raid was planned by, led by, and named after Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle (later a Lieutenant General in the US Army Air Forces and the US Air Force Reserve).

Under the final plan, 16 B-25B Mitchell medium bombers, each with a crew of five, were launched from the US Navy aircraft carrier USS Hornet, in the Pacific Ocean, off Japan. There were no fighter escorts. After bombing the military and industrial targets, the crews were to continue westward to land in China.
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Of the 16 USAAF crews involved, 14 complete crews of five returned to the United States or to US forces elsewhere – one crew was killed in action.[5][6] Eight US aviators were captured by Japanese forces in Eastern China and three of these were later executed. All but one of the B-25s were destroyed in crashes, while the 16th landed at Vladivostok, in the Soviet Union.
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President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a meeting at the White House on 21 December 1941 and said that Japan should be bombed as soon as possible to boost public morale after Pearl Harbor.[8] Doolittle recounted in his autobiography that the raid was intended to bolster American morale and to cause the Japanese to begin doubting their leadership: "An attack on the Japanese homeland would cause confusion in the minds of the Japanese people and sow doubt about the reliability of their leaders. ... Americans badly needed a morale boost."[9]




Crew No. 1 in front of B-25#40-2344 on the deck of Hornet, 18 April 1942. From left to right: (front row) Lt. Col. Jimmy Doolittle, pilot; Lt. Richard E. Cole, copilot; (back row) Lt. Henry A. Potter, navigator; SSgt. Fred A. Braemer, bombardier; SSgt. Paul J. Leonard, flight engineer/gunner.

The concept for the attack came from Navy Captain Francis S. Low, Assistant Chief of Staff for antisubmarine warfare. He reported to Admiral Ernest J. King on 10 January 1942 that he thought that twin-engined Army bombers could be launched from an aircraft carrier, after observing several at Naval Station Norfolk Chambers Field in Norfolk, where the runway was painted with the outline of a carrier deck for landing practice. ...
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When planning indicated that the B-25 was the aircraft that best met all of the requirements of the mission, two were loaded aboard the aircraft carrier USS Hornet at Norfolk, Virginia, and were flown off the deck without difficulty on 3 February 1942.[17] The raid was immediately approved and the 17th Bombardment Group (Medium) was chosen to provide the pool of crews from which volunteers would be recruited. The 17th BG had been the first group to receive B-25s, with all four of its squadrons equipped with the bomber by September 1941. The 17th not only was the first medium bomb group of the Army Air Corps, but in early 1942, also had the most experienced B-25 crews. Its first assignment following the entry of the United States into the war was to the U.S. Eighth Air Force.[18]
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Doolittle's first report on the plan suggested that the bombers might land in Vladivostok, shortening the flight by 600 nautical miles (1,100 km) on the basis of turning over the B-25s as Lend-Lease.[14] Negotiations with the Soviet Union were fruitless for permission to land because it had signed a neutrality pact with Japan in April 1941.[15] China's Chiang Kai-shek agreed to the landing sites in China despite the concern of Japanese reprisals. Five possible airfields were selected. These sites would serve as refueling stops, allowing the crews to fly to Chungking.[16] Bombers attacking defended targets often relied on a fighter escort to defend them from enemy fighters, but accompanying fighters were not possible.
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The 24 crews were selected and picked up the modified bombers in Minneapolis and flew them to Eglin Field, Florida, beginning 1 March 1942. There, the crews received concentrated training for three weeks in simulated carrier deck takeoffs, low-level and night flying, low-altitude bombing, and over-water navigation, operating primarily out of Eglin Auxiliary Field#1, a more secluded site. Lieutenant Henry L. Miller, a U.S. Navy flight instructor from nearby Naval Air Station Pensacola, supervised their takeoff training and accompanied the crews to the launch. For his efforts, Miller is considered an honorary member of the Raider group.[21]
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At 07:38 on the morning of 18 April, while the task force was still about 650 nautical miles (1,200 km; 750 mi) from Japan (around 35°N 154°E), it was sighted by the Japanese picket boat No. 23 Nittō Maru, a 70-ton patrol craft, which radioed an attack warning to Japan.[32] The boat was sunk by gunfire from USS Nashville.[note 5] The chief petty officer who captained the boat killed himself rather than be captured, but five of the 11 crew were picked up by Nashville.[34]

Doolittle and Hornet skipper Captain Marc Mitscher decided to launch the B-25s immediately—10 hours early and 170 nautical miles (310 km; 200 mi) farther from Japan than planned.[note 6] After respotting to allow for engine start and runups, Doolittle's aircraft had 467 feet (142 m) of takeoff distance.[35] Although none of the B-25 pilots, including Doolittle, had ever taken off from a carrier before, all 16 aircraft launched safely between 08:20 and 09:19, though Doolittle's bomber was witnessed to have almost hit the water before pulling up at the last second. The B-25s then flew toward Japan, most in groups of two to four aircraft, before flying singly at wave-top level to avoid detection.[36]
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Immediately following the raid, Doolittle told his crew that he believed the loss of all 16 aircraft, coupled with the relatively minor damage to targets, had rendered the attack a failure, and that he expected a court-martial upon his return to the United States.[48] Instead, the raid bolstered American morale. Doolittle was promoted two grades to brigadier general on 28 April while still in China, skipping the rank of colonel, and was presented with the Medal of Honor by Roosevelt upon his return to the United States in June. When General Doolittle toured the growing Eglin Field facility in July 1942 with commanding officer Col. Grandison Gardner, the local paper of record (the Okaloosa News-Journal, Crestview, Florida), while reporting his presence, made no mention of his still-secret recent training at Eglin. He went on to command the Twelfth Air Force in North Africa, the Fifteenth Air Force in the Mediterranean, and the Eighth Air Force in England during the next three years.

All 80 Raiders were awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, and those who were killed or wounded during the raid were awarded the Purple Heart. Every Doolittle Raider was also decorated by the Chinese government. In addition, Corporal David J. Thatcher (a flight engineer/gunner on Lawson's crew) and 1st Lt. Thomas R. White (flight surgeon/gunner with Smith) were awarded the Silver Star for helping the wounded crew members of Lt. Lawson's crew to evade Japanese troops in China. Finally, as Doolittle noted in his autobiography, he successfully insisted that all of the Raiders receive a promotion.[full citation needed]

Twenty-eight of the crewmen remained in the China Burma India theater, including the entire crews of planes 4, 10, and 13, flying missions, most for more than a year; five were killed in action.[note 9][49] Nineteen crew members flew combat missions in the Mediterranean theater after returning to the United States, four of whom were killed in action and four becoming prisoners of war.[note 10] Nine crew members served in the European Theater of Operations; one was killed in action, and one, David M. "Davy" Jones, was shot down and became a POW in Stalag Luft III at Sagan, where he played a part in The Great Escape.[50] Altogether, 12 of the survivors died in air crashes within 15 months of the raid. Two survivors were separated from the USAAF in 1944 due to the severity of their injuries.[5]
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It shocked the Japanese and dented their 'Master Race' fantasy no end. They then began making more mistakes and serious ones. They then should have focused on withdrawing from many of their conquests, they were too strung out, but they simply upped the ante in the opposite direction, hoping to bully their way out of failure. They doubled down on Stupid, same as most batshit crazy ideologues always do.

In the meantime, MacArthur got away with being extremely incompetent and losing his bomber fleet to a very unsurprising Japanese air attack.
They did none of the sort in 1942. Japan was on a roll with the defeat of Bataan and the Brit surrender at Singapore. The Doolittle Raid was intended to give Americans a morale boost. The Japanese shrugged it off.
 
They did none of the sort in 1942. Japan was on a roll with the defeat of Bataan and the Brit surrender at Singapore. The Doolittle Raid was intended to give Americans a morale boost. The Japanese shrugged it off.
Shrugged it off? They killed 250,000 Chinese for it and got the go ahead for Midway.
 
Shrugged it off? They killed 250,000 Chinese for it and got the go ahead for Midway.
Which turned out to be a foolhardy venture(Midway) that resulted in the loss of the major portion of the aircraft carrier forces far earlier in the war than they had hoped. Meaning that their far perimeter defense line for early warning and response was negated since they would have little effective response to deploy.

Meanwhile, the loss of 16 aircraft of a type that would eventually seen nearly 10,000* built as a cheap price to pay for the results gained. Most of the aircrews would survive and fight in other areas around the world and experience gained from the venture would pay back later.

Note that days prior to "Midway", the IJN launched the invasions of the Aleutian Islands as another notch in their outer alert/defense perimeter meant to draw USN forces away from the next step move towards Midway. USA/USN failed to take that bait and thanks to our code-breaking were ready to ambush the Japs at Midway.

The Doolittle Raid helped cause Japan to over-reach ~ over-extend in ways that would make it's forces vulnerable to defend and destruction, which would result in shortening the length of the campaigns in the PTO.

*North American B-25 Mitchell - Wikipedia
 

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