COIN and Afghanistan

[Divine Wind]

Is our strategy in Afghanistan working? Is COIN the best way to handle it? Should we bail or should we send in reinforcements?

I think COIN, Counterinsurgency, is the most effective means of winning a war against a guerrilla force hiding among the local population. Unlike conventional warfare, it isn't as easy to determine victory since it usually doesn't involve large battles, defined front lines or acquisition and control of real estate.


http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/coin/repository/COIN_Center_Pamphlet.pdf

“In the conventional war, military action, seconded by diplomacy, propaganda, and economic pressure, is generally the principal way to achieve the goal. Politics as an instrument of
war tends to take a back seat and emerges again—as an instrument—when the fi ghting ends….
The picture is different in the revolutionary war. The objective being the population itself, the
operations designed to win it over (for the insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for the
counterinsurgent) are essentially of a political nature. In this case, consequently, political action
remains foremost throughout the war. It is not enough for the government to set political goals,
to determine how much military force is applicable, to enter into alliances or to break them; politics becomes an active instrument of operation. And so intricate is the interplay between the political and the military actions that they cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary, every military move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects, and vice versa.” David Galula,
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International,
2006 [1964]), 66.

US Army Combined Arms Center | Blank Page

 

[Divine Wind]

The COIN field manual is available on Amazon, but also available on the web.

Marine Corps COIN manual


http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf

Here is the U.S. government guide on COIN: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf

 

[Sallow]

As for your choices..none of the above.

I would say that it's sort of working, but the expense is simply not worth it. Afghanistan is much to tribal at this point to achieve a cohesive, functional, western democracy and that sort of thing grows as a result of domestic desire. It needs to come from the Afghans.

 

[Divine Wind]

As for your choices..none of the above.

I would say that it's sort of working, but the expense is simply not worth it. Afghanistan is much to tribal at this point to achieve a cohesive, functional, western democracy and that sort of thing grows as a result of domestic desire. It needs to come from the Afghans.

Uhh, dude, that's what COIN is. We're just there to give them the opportunity to do it.

 

[Sallow]

As for your choices..none of the above.

I would say that it's sort of working, but the expense is simply not worth it. Afghanistan is much to tribal at this point to achieve a cohesive, functional, western democracy and that sort of thing grows as a result of domestic desire. It needs to come from the Afghans.

Uhh, dude, that's what COIN is. We're just there to give them the opportunity to do it.

Yes and no. Yes it's the Afghans but no it's not domestic. That's not "their" homegrown idea.

 

[Divine Wind]

As for your choices..none of the above.

I would say that it's sort of working, but the expense is simply not worth it. Afghanistan is much to tribal at this point to achieve a cohesive, functional, western democracy and that sort of thing grows as a result of domestic desire. It needs to come from the Afghans.

Uhh, dude, that's what COIN is. We're just there to give them the opportunity to do it.

Yes and no. Yes it's the Afghans but no it's not domestic. That's not "their" homegrown idea.

COIN isn't their homegrown idea? Agreed. So what? That's like saying your house is on fire but you don't want to use the services of the volunteer fire department because you want to be independent.

BTW, before the Soviets invaded, Afghanistan had a pretty well functioning government. Yes, there were problems, but overall it was not a bad place for a Third World country. Now, with all of the resources recently discovered there, they have the opportunity to grow and prosper if given the chance.

U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan - NYTimes.com

 

[Divine Wind]

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub846.pdf

The conflict in Iraq demonstrates that counterinsurgency is difficult when strategic objectives change
or remain unclear. It also shows that the U.S. obsession
with clear metrics and indicators of success complicates
counterinsurgency. Success in COIN is often difficult
to measure. There are as many setbacks as victories.
National level metrics may have little relevance at the
local level. Local ones may vary from place to place.
This means that strategic planners and policymakers
may not know with certainty what works and what does
not. Sustaining public and congressional support under
such conditions is an enduring challenge.

 

[Divine Wind]

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub586.pdf

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ARMY
• Revise the understanding of insurgency which serves as a
basis for U.S. strategy and doctrine to include the distinction
between national and liberation movements.
• Develop, refine, and wargame appropriate strategy and
doctrine for each type.
• Institutionalize methods for unified interagency approaches
to counterinsurgency support.
• Act as the advocate for holistic capability enhancement across
the government.
• Develop and exercise interagency techniques to build effective
security and intelligence forces rapidly in a failed or occupied
state.
• Develop an effects-based method of counterinsurgency
planning; test this through robust experimentation, analysis,
and wargaming.
• Develop a small, independent strategic assessment agency to
evaluate U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency support.
• Continue refining and implementing plans to increase Army
units with particular utility in counterinsurgency such as
Intelligence and Engineers, and to reconfigure and, if necessary,
augment Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units.
• Undertake strategic capacity-building by coordination with
regional security organizations and states.
• Integrate the Department of Homeland Security into strategic
planning for counterinsurgency support.
• Refine leader development and training to include emphasis on
understanding and responding to 21st century insurgency.