The following is from a speech by Bernard Lewis
Cleveland E. Dodge Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University.
It is an eye-opener, if not an epiphany.
1. What is the possibility of freedom in the Islamic world, in the Western sense of the word? There are two views common in the United States and Europe:
a. One of them holds that Islamic peoples are incapable of decent, civilized government. Whatever the West does, Muslims will be ruled by corrupt tyrants. Therefore the aim of our foreign policy should be to insure that they are our tyrants rather than someone else'sfriendly rather than hostile tyrants. This point of view is very much favored in departments of state and foreign offices and is generally known, rather surprisingly, as the pro-Arab view. It shows ignorance of the Arab past.
b. The second common view is that Arab ways are different from our ways. They must be allowed to develop in accordance with their cultural principles, but it is possible for themas for anyone else, anywhere in the world, with discreet help from outside and most specifically from the United Statesto develop democratic institutions of a kind. This view is known as the imperialist view and has been vigorously denounced and condemned as such.
But the idea that how that society is now is how it has always been is totally false. The dictatorship of Saddam Hussein in Iraq or the Assad family in Syria or the more friendly dictatorship of Mubarak in Egyptall of these have no roots whatsoever in the Arab or in the Islamic past.
2. To view traditional Islamic leadership, consider this letter by Mssr. Count de Choiseul-Gouffier, the French ambassador in Istanbul, written in 1786, in which he is trying to explain why he is making rather slow progress with the tasks entrusted to him by his government in dealing with the Ottoman government. Here, he says, things are not as in France where the king is sole master and does as he pleases. Here, he says, the sultan has to consult. He has to consult with the former holders of high offices, with the leaders of various groups and so on. And this is a slow process. This scenario is something radically different than the common image of Middle Eastern government today. And it is a description that ceased to be true because of a number of changes that occurred.
a. Modernization: This was undertaken not by imperialists, for the most part, but by Middle Eastern rulers who had become painfully aware that their societies were undeveloped compared with the advanced Western world. These rulers decided that what they had to do was to modernize or Westernize. Their intentions were good, but the consequences were often disastrous. What they did was to increase the power of the state and the ruler enormously by placing at his disposal the whole modern apparatus of control, repression and indoctrination. In the traditional society there were established orders-the bazaar merchants, the scribes, the guilds, the country gentry, the military establishment, the religious establishment, and so on. These were powerful groups in society, whose heads were not appointed by the ruler but arose from within the groups. And no sultan, however powerful, could do much without maintaining some relationship with these different orders in society. This is not democracy as we currently use that word, but it is certainly limited, responsible government. And the system worked. Modernization ended that.
b. In the year 1940, the government of France surrendered to the Axis and formed a collaborationist government in a place called Vichy. The French colonial empire was, for the most part, beyond the reach of the Nazis, which meant that the governors of the French colonies had a free choice: To stay with Vichy or to join Charles de Gaulle, who had set up a Free French Committee in London. The overwhelming majority chose Vichy, which meant that Syria-Lebanona French-mandated territory in the heart of the Arab Eastwas now wide open to the Nazis. The Nazis moved in, made a tremendous propaganda effort, and were even able to move from Syria eastwards into Iraq and for a while set up a pro-Nazi, fascist regime. It was in this period that political parties were formed that were the nucleus of what later became the Baath Party. A few after the war, the Soviets moved in, established an immensely powerful presence in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and various other countries, and introduced Soviet-style political practice. The adaptation from the Nazi model to the communist model was very simple and easy, requiring only a few minor adjustments.
3. Two other factors added to the mix produce the picture we see today.
a. The first of thesefounded by a theologian called Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who lived in a remote area of Najd in desert Arabiais known as Wahhabi. Its argument is that the root of Arab-Islamic troubles lies in following the ways of the infidel.
b. The other important thing that happenedalso in the mid-20swas the discovery of oil. With that, this extremist sect found itself not only in possession of Mecca and Medina, but also of wealth beyond the dreams of avarice. As a result, what would otherwise have been a lunatic fringe in a marginal country became a major force in the world of Islam. Now, its influence spreads far beyond the region.
5. There are, as I've tried to point out, elements in Islamic society which could well be conducive to democracy. And there are encouraging signs at the present momentwhat happened in Iraq, for example, with millions of Iraqis willing to stand in line to vote, knowing that they were risking their lives, is a quite extraordinary achievement. It's interesting that pro-American feeling is strongest in countries with anti-American governments. I've been told repeatedly by Iranians that there is no country in the world where pro-American feeling is stronger, deeper and more widespread than Iran. I've heard this from so many different Iraniansincluding some still living in Iranthat I believe it. When the American planes were flying over Afghanistan, the story was that many Iranians put signs on their roofs in English reading, This way, please.
I think that the cause of developing free institutionsalong their lines, not oursis possible. One can see signs of its beginning in some countries. At the same time, the forces working against it are very powerful and well entrenched. And one of the greatest dangers is that on their side, they are firm and convinced and resolute. Whereas on our side, we are weak and undecided and irresolute. And in such a combat, it is not difficult to see which side will prevail.
I think that the effort is difficult and the outcome uncertain, but I think the effort must be made. Either we bring them freedom, or they destroy us.
https://www.hillsdale.edu/news/imprimis/archive/issue.asp?year=2006&month=09
Cleveland E. Dodge Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University.
It is an eye-opener, if not an epiphany.
1. What is the possibility of freedom in the Islamic world, in the Western sense of the word? There are two views common in the United States and Europe:
a. One of them holds that Islamic peoples are incapable of decent, civilized government. Whatever the West does, Muslims will be ruled by corrupt tyrants. Therefore the aim of our foreign policy should be to insure that they are our tyrants rather than someone else'sfriendly rather than hostile tyrants. This point of view is very much favored in departments of state and foreign offices and is generally known, rather surprisingly, as the pro-Arab view. It shows ignorance of the Arab past.
b. The second common view is that Arab ways are different from our ways. They must be allowed to develop in accordance with their cultural principles, but it is possible for themas for anyone else, anywhere in the world, with discreet help from outside and most specifically from the United Statesto develop democratic institutions of a kind. This view is known as the imperialist view and has been vigorously denounced and condemned as such.
But the idea that how that society is now is how it has always been is totally false. The dictatorship of Saddam Hussein in Iraq or the Assad family in Syria or the more friendly dictatorship of Mubarak in Egyptall of these have no roots whatsoever in the Arab or in the Islamic past.
2. To view traditional Islamic leadership, consider this letter by Mssr. Count de Choiseul-Gouffier, the French ambassador in Istanbul, written in 1786, in which he is trying to explain why he is making rather slow progress with the tasks entrusted to him by his government in dealing with the Ottoman government. Here, he says, things are not as in France where the king is sole master and does as he pleases. Here, he says, the sultan has to consult. He has to consult with the former holders of high offices, with the leaders of various groups and so on. And this is a slow process. This scenario is something radically different than the common image of Middle Eastern government today. And it is a description that ceased to be true because of a number of changes that occurred.
a. Modernization: This was undertaken not by imperialists, for the most part, but by Middle Eastern rulers who had become painfully aware that their societies were undeveloped compared with the advanced Western world. These rulers decided that what they had to do was to modernize or Westernize. Their intentions were good, but the consequences were often disastrous. What they did was to increase the power of the state and the ruler enormously by placing at his disposal the whole modern apparatus of control, repression and indoctrination. In the traditional society there were established orders-the bazaar merchants, the scribes, the guilds, the country gentry, the military establishment, the religious establishment, and so on. These were powerful groups in society, whose heads were not appointed by the ruler but arose from within the groups. And no sultan, however powerful, could do much without maintaining some relationship with these different orders in society. This is not democracy as we currently use that word, but it is certainly limited, responsible government. And the system worked. Modernization ended that.
b. In the year 1940, the government of France surrendered to the Axis and formed a collaborationist government in a place called Vichy. The French colonial empire was, for the most part, beyond the reach of the Nazis, which meant that the governors of the French colonies had a free choice: To stay with Vichy or to join Charles de Gaulle, who had set up a Free French Committee in London. The overwhelming majority chose Vichy, which meant that Syria-Lebanona French-mandated territory in the heart of the Arab Eastwas now wide open to the Nazis. The Nazis moved in, made a tremendous propaganda effort, and were even able to move from Syria eastwards into Iraq and for a while set up a pro-Nazi, fascist regime. It was in this period that political parties were formed that were the nucleus of what later became the Baath Party. A few after the war, the Soviets moved in, established an immensely powerful presence in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and various other countries, and introduced Soviet-style political practice. The adaptation from the Nazi model to the communist model was very simple and easy, requiring only a few minor adjustments.
3. Two other factors added to the mix produce the picture we see today.
a. The first of thesefounded by a theologian called Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who lived in a remote area of Najd in desert Arabiais known as Wahhabi. Its argument is that the root of Arab-Islamic troubles lies in following the ways of the infidel.
b. The other important thing that happenedalso in the mid-20swas the discovery of oil. With that, this extremist sect found itself not only in possession of Mecca and Medina, but also of wealth beyond the dreams of avarice. As a result, what would otherwise have been a lunatic fringe in a marginal country became a major force in the world of Islam. Now, its influence spreads far beyond the region.
5. There are, as I've tried to point out, elements in Islamic society which could well be conducive to democracy. And there are encouraging signs at the present momentwhat happened in Iraq, for example, with millions of Iraqis willing to stand in line to vote, knowing that they were risking their lives, is a quite extraordinary achievement. It's interesting that pro-American feeling is strongest in countries with anti-American governments. I've been told repeatedly by Iranians that there is no country in the world where pro-American feeling is stronger, deeper and more widespread than Iran. I've heard this from so many different Iraniansincluding some still living in Iranthat I believe it. When the American planes were flying over Afghanistan, the story was that many Iranians put signs on their roofs in English reading, This way, please.
I think that the cause of developing free institutionsalong their lines, not oursis possible. One can see signs of its beginning in some countries. At the same time, the forces working against it are very powerful and well entrenched. And one of the greatest dangers is that on their side, they are firm and convinced and resolute. Whereas on our side, we are weak and undecided and irresolute. And in such a combat, it is not difficult to see which side will prevail.
I think that the effort is difficult and the outcome uncertain, but I think the effort must be made. Either we bring them freedom, or they destroy us.
https://www.hillsdale.edu/news/imprimis/archive/issue.asp?year=2006&month=09
