Benghazi Accountability Review Board Report Released DrewM. www.ace.mu.nu December 19, 2012 The review board, chaired by former Ambassador Thomas Pickering and vice-chaired by retired Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen found multiple systemic failures which lead to the events of September 11, 2012 in Benghazi. http://http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf A couple of highlights from the report (pdf) (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf) that address issues which became the topic of conversation following the attack. Not mentioned in the ARB? YouTube video -The Board concluded that there was no protest prior to the attacks ... -In the weeks and months leading up to the attacks, the response from post, Embassy Tripoli, and Washington to a deteriorating security situation was inadequate. At the same time, the SMCs dependence on the armed but poorly skilled Libyan February 17 Martyrs Brigade (February 17) militia members and unarmed, locally contracted Blue Mountain Libya (BML) guards for security support was misplaced. ... -At the direction of the U.S. militarys Africa Command (AFRICOM), DoD moved a remotely piloted, unarmed surveillance aircraft which arrived over the SMC shortly before the DS team departed. A second remotely piloted, unarmed surveillance aircraft relieved the first, and monitored the eventual evacuation of personnel from the Annex to Benghazi airport later on the morning of September 12. ... -The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was not enough time given the speed of the attacks for armed U.S. military assets to have made a difference. On the larger issues of how state handles security at temporary Systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the State Department (the Department) resulted in a Special Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly inadequate to deal with the attack that took place. Security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as a shared responsibility by the bureaus in Washington charged with supporting the post, resulting in stove-piped discussions and decisions on policy and security. That said, Embassy Tripoli did not demonstrate strong and sustained advocacy with Washington for increased security for Special Mission Benghazi. -The short-term, transitory nature of Special Mission Benghazis staffing, with talented and committed, but relatively inexperienced, American personnel often on temporary assignments of 40 days or less, resulted in diminished institutional knowledge, continuity, and mission capacity. Amazingly, the so-called Accountability Review Board either chose not to or was not empowered to actually hold anyone ACCOUNTABLE.