There is little chance that the talks on missile defense in Europe will succeed. The Russian plan for sectoral missile defense provides for joint participation on an equal footing in developing theater missile defense. This is not acceptable to the United States and does not jibe with the structure of relations within NATO.
Valdaiclub.com interview with Alexei Fenenko, Leading Research Fellow, Institute of International Security Studies of RAS, Russian Academy of Sciences
There is little chance that the talks on missile defense in Europe will succeed, in my opinion. Nuclear deterrence is the foundation on which Russia and the United States construct their relations. Should the U.S. deploy a missile defense system, this will undermine bilateral relations. Since 1999, Washington has made no secret of the fact that its strategic goal is to make the territory of the United States and its allies invulnerable to attack. Washington wants to move beyond the logic of mutually assured destruction. NATOs new strategic concept views the deployment of American missile defense systems as a new foundation for guaranteeing the security of Americas allies in Europe. Russia, for its part, has serious concerns that the United States is trying to undermine its strategic capabilities with this missile defense system. This is particularly alarming given the reduction of strategic offensive arms under New START and the impending withdrawal of the nuclear systems built in the 1980s over the next 15 years.
The talks on missile defense have unfolded according to this logic. In the spring of 2000, then president Vladimir Putin proposed to British prime minister Tony Blair that Russia and the EU create a joint missile defense system. The administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush saw the Russian proposal as an attempt to torpedo the U.S. missile defense system and drive a wedge between NATO allies on this issue. At a summit in Rome in May 2002, NATO put forward its own compromise Russian participation in the development of theater missile defense but not in command and control. Judging by the reaction to Medvedevs speech in Lisbon, this is the only compromise the West is prepared to accept. The Russian plan for sectoral missile defense, on the other hand, provides for joint participation on an equal footing in developing theater missile defense. This is not acceptable to the United States and does not jibe with the structure of relations within NATO.
But this is not the main issue. In Lisbon, Medvedev said with good reason that we still have 10 years to reach an agreement on missile defense otherwise, a new arms race will be unavoidable. However, in 10 years the balance of strategic capabilities may change to Russias disadvantage because of cuts in its nuclear arsenal and the deployment (albeit in a limited scope) of an American missile defense system. Meanwhile, New START, which contains a provision linking strategic defensive and offensive arms, expires in 2020. Before that time, Moscow would like to conclude an agreement with Washington on missile defense that preserves the logic of mutually assured destruction. It became clear at U.S. and Russian presidents summit in Washington on June 24, 2010 that the White House is not prepared to accept mutually binding limitations on strategic missile defense. This is why Russia, in the fall of 2010, added sectoral defense in Europe to the agenda of missile defense talks.
The full version of the interview was published on valdaiclub.com
Valdaiclub.com interview with Alexei Fenenko, Leading Research Fellow, Institute of International Security Studies of RAS, Russian Academy of Sciences
There is little chance that the talks on missile defense in Europe will succeed, in my opinion. Nuclear deterrence is the foundation on which Russia and the United States construct their relations. Should the U.S. deploy a missile defense system, this will undermine bilateral relations. Since 1999, Washington has made no secret of the fact that its strategic goal is to make the territory of the United States and its allies invulnerable to attack. Washington wants to move beyond the logic of mutually assured destruction. NATOs new strategic concept views the deployment of American missile defense systems as a new foundation for guaranteeing the security of Americas allies in Europe. Russia, for its part, has serious concerns that the United States is trying to undermine its strategic capabilities with this missile defense system. This is particularly alarming given the reduction of strategic offensive arms under New START and the impending withdrawal of the nuclear systems built in the 1980s over the next 15 years.
The talks on missile defense have unfolded according to this logic. In the spring of 2000, then president Vladimir Putin proposed to British prime minister Tony Blair that Russia and the EU create a joint missile defense system. The administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush saw the Russian proposal as an attempt to torpedo the U.S. missile defense system and drive a wedge between NATO allies on this issue. At a summit in Rome in May 2002, NATO put forward its own compromise Russian participation in the development of theater missile defense but not in command and control. Judging by the reaction to Medvedevs speech in Lisbon, this is the only compromise the West is prepared to accept. The Russian plan for sectoral missile defense, on the other hand, provides for joint participation on an equal footing in developing theater missile defense. This is not acceptable to the United States and does not jibe with the structure of relations within NATO.
But this is not the main issue. In Lisbon, Medvedev said with good reason that we still have 10 years to reach an agreement on missile defense otherwise, a new arms race will be unavoidable. However, in 10 years the balance of strategic capabilities may change to Russias disadvantage because of cuts in its nuclear arsenal and the deployment (albeit in a limited scope) of an American missile defense system. Meanwhile, New START, which contains a provision linking strategic defensive and offensive arms, expires in 2020. Before that time, Moscow would like to conclude an agreement with Washington on missile defense that preserves the logic of mutually assured destruction. It became clear at U.S. and Russian presidents summit in Washington on June 24, 2010 that the White House is not prepared to accept mutually binding limitations on strategic missile defense. This is why Russia, in the fall of 2010, added sectoral defense in Europe to the agenda of missile defense talks.
The full version of the interview was published on valdaiclub.com
