Skull Pilot
Diamond Member
- Nov 17, 2007
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This is a lie.
This is also a lie.
my statements are true. but please go with the NRA party line.
The “Good Guy With a Gun” Is a Myth
my problem is not with guns, per se. it's with people who shouldn't have guns getting them
The argument you are using in bunk.
No CCW holder is obligated in anyway to draw his weapon to stop a criminal.
Quite frankly unless my or my wife's life is in jeopardy I will not draw my weapon and that is how it should be.
IMO if you're getting mugged or assaulted and you have chosen not to arm yourself and to let the police protect you then if my or my wife's life is not in danger I will call the cops for you and hope you don't get killed or permanently maimed before they show up.
See that's me respecting your choice. All you have to do is respect mine
Wow. Some of that is right in every way. Some of it is acceptable if not unequivocally virtuous. Some of it is ethically tolerable more so than acceptable. Some of it is ineffably turpitudinous morally. I don't often see such a spectrum of expressions from one person in so few words. Indeed, I can't honestly say I've seen that before.
I see nothing turpitudinous about my stance.
I have no moral, legal or ethical obligation to come to anyone's defense.
I have absolutely no right to tell other people what to do which also means I respect their personal choices.
If a person chooses to go unarmed then he is choosing to either rely on his martial arts skills or the police to come to his aid if his safety or life is ever threatened by a criminal.
If that person saw me getting assaulted all they could do is call the cops so why should I do more for them they they are willing to do for themselves or anyone else?
Red:
That's obvious. Not for any particular reason other than that by dint of the benefit of the doubt alone I presume you, or any other individual, aren't so depraved that you would willfully espouse ideas or perform acts that you recognize as being worthy of disdain. My presumption to that effect won't survive one's displaying unequivocal evidence that it's not deserved, but prior to that happening, I will accord anyone the favor due them, if for no other reason, existential uncertainty.
Blue:
One of the classic moral problems is the issue of whether or not we have moral obligations to people we do not know. If we do have such obligations, then there are also questions about the foundation, nature and extent of these obligations. If we do not have such obligations, then there is the obvious question about why there are no such obligations. I will start by considering some stock arguments regarding our obligations to others.
One approach to the matter of moral obligations to others is to ground them on religion. This requires two main steps. The first is establishing that the religion imposes such obligations. The second is making the transition from the realm of religion to the domain of ethics.
Many religions do impose such obligations on their followers. For example, John 15:12 conveys God’s command: “This is my commandment, That you love one another, as I have loved you.” If love involves obligations (which it seems to), then this would certainly seem to place us under these obligations. Other faiths also include injunctions to assist others.
In terms of transitioning from religion to ethics, one easy way is to appeal to divine command theory—the moral theory that what God commands is right because He commands it. This does raise the classic Euthyphro problem: is something good because God commands it, or is it commanded because it is good? If the former, goodness seems arbitrary. If the latter, then morality would be independent of God and divine command theory would be false.
Using religion as the basis for moral obligation is also problematic because doing so would require proving that the religion is correct—this would be no easy task. There is also the practical problem that people differ in their faiths and this would make a universal grounding for moral obligations difficult.
Another approach is to argue for moral obligations by using the moral method of reversing the situation. This method is based on the Golden Rule (“do unto others as you would have them do unto you”) and the basic idea is that consistency requires that a person treat others as she would wish to be treated.
To make the method work, a person would need to want others to act as if they had obligations to her and this would thus obligate the person to act as if she had obligations to them. For example, if I would want someone to help me if I were struck by a car and bleeding out in the street, then consistency would require that I accept the same obligation on my part. That is, if I accept that I should be helped, then consistency requires that I must accept I should help others.
This approach is somewhat like that taken by Immanuel Kant. He argues that because a person necessarily regards herself as an end (and not just a means to an end), then she must also regard others as ends and not merely as means. He endeavors to use this to argue in favor of various obligations and duties, such as helping others in need.
There are, unfortunately, at least two counters to this sort of approach. The first is that it is easy enough to imagine a person who is willing to forgo the assistance of others and as such can consistently refuse to accept obligations to others. So, for example, a person might be willing to starve rather than accept assistance from other people. While such people might seem a bit crazy, if they are sincere then they cannot be accused of inconsistency.
The second is that a person can argue that there is a relevant difference between himself and others that would justify their obligations to him while freeing him from obligations to them. For example, a person of a high social or economic class might assert that her status obligates people of lesser classes while freeing her from any obligations to them. Naturally, the person must provide reasons in support of this alleged relevant difference.
A third approach is to present a utilitarian argument. For a utilitarian, like John Stuart Mill, morality is assessed in terms of consequences: the correct action is the one that creates the greatest utility (typically happiness) for the greatest number. A utilitarian argument for obligations to people we do not know would be rather straightforward. The first step would be to estimate the utility generated by accepting a specific obligation to people we do not know, such as rendering aid to an intoxicated person who is about to become the victim of sexual assault. The second step is to estimate the disutility generated by imposing that specific obligation. The third step is to weigh the utility against the disutility. If the utility is greater, then such an obligation should be imposed. If the disutility is greater, then it should not.
This approach, obviously enough, rests on the acceptance of utilitarianism. There are numerous arguments against this moral theory and these can be employed against attempts to ground obligations on utility. Even for those who accept utilitarianism, there is the open possibility that there will always be greater utility in not imposing obligations, thus undermining the claim that we have obligations to others.
A fourth approach is to consider the matter in terms of rational self-interest and operate from the assumption that people should act in their self-interest. In terms of a moral theory, this would be ethical egoism: the moral theory that a person should act in her self-interest rather than acting in an altruistic manner.
While accepting that others have obligations to me would certainly be in my self-interest, it initially appears that accepting obligations to others would be contrary to my self-interest. That is, I would be best served if others did unto me as I would like to be done unto, but I was free to do unto them as I wished. If I could get away with this sort of thing, it would be ideal (assuming that I am selfish). However, as a matter of fact people tend to notice and respond negatively to a lack of reciprocation. So, if having others accept that they have some obligations to me were in my self-interest, then it would seem that it would be in my self-interest to pay the price for such obligations by accepting obligations to them.
For those who like evolutionary just-so stories in the context of providing foundations for ethics, the tale is easy to tell: those who accept obligations to others would be more successful than those who do not.
The stock counter to the self-interest argument is the problem of Glaucon’s unjust man and Hume’s sensible knave. While it certainly seems rational to accept obligations to others in return for getting them to accept similar obligations, it seems preferable to exploit their acceptance of obligations while avoiding one’s supposed obligations to others whenever possible. Assuming that a person should act in accord with self-interest, then this is what a person should do.
It can be argued that this approach would be self-defeating: if people exploited others without reciprocation, the system of obligations would eventually fall apart. As such, each person has an interest in ensuring that others hold to their obligations. Humans do, in fact, seem to act this way—those who fail in their obligations often get a bad reputation and are distrusted. From a purely practical standpoint, acting as if one has obligations to others would thus seem to be in a person’s self-interest because the benefits would generally outweigh the costs.
The counter to this is that each person still has an interest in avoiding the cost of fulfilling obligations and there are various practical ways to do this by the use of deceit, power and such. As such, a classic moral question arises once again: why act on your alleged obligations if you can get away with not doing so? Aside from the practical reply given above, there seems to be no answer from self-interest.
A fifth option is to look at obligations to others as a matter of debts. A person is born into an established human civilization built on thousands of years of human effort. Since each person arrives as a helpless infant, each person’s survival is dependent on others. As the person grows up, she also depends on the efforts of countless other people she does not know. These include soldiers that defend her society, the people who maintain the infrastructure, firefighters who keep fire from sweeping away the town or city, the taxpayers who pay for all this, and so on for all the many others who make human civilization possible. As such, each member of civilization owes a considerable debt to those who have come before and those who are here now.
If debt imposes an obligation, then each person who did not arise ex-nihilo owes a debt to those who have made and continue to make their survival and existence in society possible. At the very least, the person is obligated to make contributions to continue human civilization as a repayment to these others.
One objection to this is for a person to claim that she owes no such debt because her special status obligates others to provide all this for her with nothing owed in return. The obvious challenge is for a person to prove such an exalted status.
Another objection is for a person to claim that all this is a gift that requires no repayment on the part of anyone and hence does not impose any obligation. The challenge is, of course, to prove this implausible claim.
A final option I will consider is that offered by virtue theory. Virtue theory, famously presented by thinkers like Aristotle and Confucius, holds that people should develop their virtues. These classic virtues include generosity, loyalty and other virtues that involve obligations and duties to others. Confucius explicitly argued in favor of duties and obligations as being key components of virtues.
In terms of why a person should have such virtues and accept such obligations, the standard answer is that being virtuous will make a person happy. Virtue theory is not without its detractors and the criticism of the theory can be employed to undercut it, thus undermining its role in arguing that we have obligations to people we do not know.
By all means, respect another's choice not to own a firearm; however do not misconstrue that, by inapt conflation, as being a willful choice to have their well being compromised by a gun wielding other. Surely, for example, you don't think that conscientious objectors actively choose to prefer to have their homeland invaded by another sovereign power.
When you have some time, I suggest reading the following:
The context of your ideas is that your using your personal ranged weapon, a gun, to aid (or not) someone else who is in imminent danger, that can be averted by your using your gun to aid the other individual. After reading the ideas expressed at the links above, if not the essay in this post, I would hope that you come to understand the depravity of your refraining from delivering that mode of assistance.
- Kant's Moral Philosophy (the whole chapter, including the "sublinks" -- there is a higher level summary here, but I suspect the more detailed variant is better suited to your situation)
- Special Obligations (the whole chapter, including the "sublinks")
- MORAL OBLIGATIONS TO DISTANT OTHERS
- A RIGHT/DUTY PERSPECTIVE ON THE LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NO-DUTY-TO-RESCUE RULE
- Three Duties to Rescue: Moral, Civil, and Criminal
- The Extension and Limits of the Duty to Rescue
The depravity would be me risking my life and the future of my family to help someone who refused to help himself.
Any law abiding citizen can exercise his legal right to self protection with a firearm. If they choose not to I am not responsible for them
My wife means more to me that any other person on this earth. I will gladly risk my life to protect her. You have that same obligation to protect your family. Don't expect others to do it for you
